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IDENTITY OF PARTIES IN BRIEF
For purposes of this Brief and in compliance with URAP 24(d),
Appellants, Kay Gneitting, Kerry Rick Hubble, and Wilderness
Building Systems, Inc. shall be referred to jointly herein as
"Wilderness

and Hubble".

Appellee, Dennis Vance, shall be

referred to herein as "Vance".

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This appeal was poured-over to the Court of Appeals for
disposition by the Supreme Court on April 19, 1996.

STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D(d)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Taken from the Summary of Argument portion of Wilderness and
Hubble's Brief (pages 3-4), Wilderness and Hubble appear to be
presenting the following issues for this Court's review:
1.

Was the commission to which Vance was entitled pursuant

to an agreement with Leon and Arlene Robinson

("Robinsons")

"earnings from personal services", thereby making "twenty-five per
centum" of those disposable earnings the maximum amount available
for attachment or garnishment within the meaning of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 64(D)?

2.

Was the trial court's order for the disclosure of the

dollar amount of the settlement agreement among Robinsons, Kerry
Rick Hubble, and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., in camera, in
chambers to Vance's counsel, proper?
3.

Did the trial court appropriately enter a judgment in

favor of Dennis Vance for $12,751.08?
Other matters creep into Wilderness and Hubble's Brief and
are addressed in the body of Vance's Brief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is correctness, without deference to
the trial court.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

In April of 1992, Vance, entered into an oral agreement

with Robinsons whereby he agreed to personally work with an
attorney retained to represent the Robinsons against Wilderness
and Hubble and to provide that attorney with the facts of which he
was aware to enable the Robinsons to file a lawsuit and, through
his continued aid, obtain a judgment against Wilderness and

Hubble. (Affidavit
2.

of Vance, U , R710)

In consideration for his personal services, Vance was to

receive a commission of 40% of the amounts recovered by the
Robinsons after a judgment was entered against Wilderness and
Hubble, less Robinsons' costs and attorney's fees. (Response

Scott

Mitchell,

attorney

for the Robinsons
2

dated April

14,

of

1995,

R724-725;
3.

Affidavit

of Vance, 53, R710)

Scott Mitchell was retained to represent the interests

of the Robinsons against Wilderness and Hubble and successfully
obtained a judgment against them for $41,364.53 on 30 April, 1993,
and an additional judgment against Wilderness and Hubble for
punitive damages in the amount of $49,560.12 on August 18, 1994.
On that same day a judgment was rendered against Vance and in
favor of Wilderness and Hubble for $24,780.56.
4.

On

or

about

the

20th

day

of

September

of 1994,

Wilderness and Hubble filed a Motion and a Memorandum in Support
of Motion for an Order of Execution against Vance's payment
proceeds pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69.
5.

(R380-387)

As part of that Memorandum, specifically at paragraph 5

thereof, Wilderness and Hubble asserted "that they are entitled to
a garnishment order against any and all sums due Dennis Blaine
Vance from Leon and Arlene Robinson".
6.

(R385)

On the 20th day of October of 1994, the trial court

signed an Order and Writ of Attachment ("Initial Order") pursuant
to Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
7.

(R423-425)

The Initial Order instructed the:

"Sheriff or Constable of Salt Lake County . . . to
collect the judgment, with costs, interest, and fees,
and to sell enough of Third Party Defendant's fVance'si
non-exempt personal property, including but not limited
to any and all sums due and owing by Leon and Arlene
Robinson to said Third Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine
Vance . . . " (R424)
8.

On the 17th day of February of 1995, an Application for

Writ of Garnishment was filed to garnish amounts owed by the
3

Robinsons to Vance, and the court issued an Order of Attachment.
(R655-656
9.

and Wilderness

and Hubble's

Brief

f5 at page

1)

On or about the 13th day of March, 1995, the trial court

signed an Amended Order ("Amended Order") pursuant to Rule 69 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
10.

(R658-660)

The Amended Order signed, pursuant to the old Rule 69 (o)

(now 69(s)) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered that:
"any and all sums due and owing by Plaintiffs Leon and
Arlene Robinson to Third Party Defendant, Dennis Blaine
Vance are attached and shall be applied towards
satisfaction of the Third Party Plaintiff's judgments
against Third Party Defendant". (R659-660)
The Amended Order made no reference to non-exempt property as had
(See Fact %7)

been properly noted in the Initial Order.
11.

Rule 69(o) URCP, (now 69(s) which was in effect at the

time of the court's order), grants courts only the right to:
"order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt
from execution, in possession of the judgment debtor or
any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, to be
applied toward satisfaction of the judgment". (URCP
69(s),
emphasis
added)
12.

At the time the Amended Order was signed, only the

proceeds

from

an

earlier

garnishment

against

the Robinsons

received

from West One Bank were in the possession of the

Robinsons and none of the amounts which were transferred or
credited for the personal services of Vance, apparently on March
16, 1995, were in the possession of the Robinsons.
Fact #9 from Vance' s Memorandum in Support
R688; See responsive
and Hubble

of Claim for

Memorandum in Opposition

R726-736)
4

(Uncontroverted

filed

by

Exemption,
Wilderness

13.

At no time have any of the proceeds to which Vance is

entitled from the Robinsons pursuant to the agreement for personal
services been in Vance's possession. (Incontroverted
Vance's

Memorandum in Support

responsive

of Claim for

Memorandum in Opposition

R726-736;

See also

11,

f 6,

1995,
14.

filed

uncontroverted

Fact #10 from

Exemption,

by Wilderness

Affidavit

R688;

See

and Hubble

of Vance dated

April

R709-711)

The amount due and owing Vance from the Robinsons was

based solely upon a contract for personal services between Vance
and the Robinsons wherein Vance was to receive 40% of all amounts
recovered by the Robinsons as Plaintiffs and against Wilderness
and Hubble, less attorney's fees and costs.
Robinsons
Dennis

in their
Vance"

Robinsons

15.

filed

on April

Vance dated

"Response

April

by
14,

11,

to Claim of Exemption

Scott
1995,

1995,

(See

B. Mitchell,
R724-725;

admission

of

on Behalf

of

attorney

See also

for

the

Affidavit

of

R709-711)

Vance performed all services necessary in order to

enable the Robinsons to recover a judgment against Wilderness and
Hubble.
Support

(Uncontroverted

Fact

#12

of Claim for Exemption,

in Opposition
uncontroverted

filed

R689;

by Wilderness

Affidavit

from

Vance's

Memorandum

See responsive

and Hubble R726-236;

of Vance dated April

in

Memorandum
See

11, 1995, H 5,

also
R709-

711)
16.

On or about the 16th day of March, 1995, on the eve of

foreclosure of assets of Wilderness and Hubble, Wilderness and
Hubble

and

Robinsons

entered

into
5

a

Stipulated

Settlement

Agreement, designed to be confidential in nature, wherein the
total judgment was deemed satisfied. (See Wilderness

and

Brief,

Brief)

55 at page
17.

8 and Exhibit

D attached

to that

Hubble's

Funds to which Vance would otherwise have been entitled

under his agreement with the Robinsons were retained by Wilderness
and Hubble as an offset under the apparent authority of the
Amended Order and were never delivered to the Robinsons or Vance.
(Uncontroverted
Claim

for

#14 from Vance's

Exemption,

Opposition
18.

Fact

filed

R689;

See

by Wilderness

Memorandum in Support
responsive

and Hubble

Memorandum

of
in

R726-736)

Rule 69(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended

effective January 1, 1995) requires that at the time a Writ of
Execution is issued, the clerk shall attach to the writ a notice
of execution and exemptions and a right to a hearing and two
copies of an application by which the judgment debtor may request
a hearing. (URCP
19.

No such notice was ever given to the judgment debtor,

Dennis Vance.
Support

69(g))

(Uncontroverted

Fact #16 from Vance' s Memorandum in

of Claim for Exemption,

in Opposition
the file

filed

reflecting

20.

R689;

by Wilderness
no

See responsive

and Hubble,

R726-736;

Memorandum
See

also

notice.)

Section 69(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended

effective January 1, 1995), states that "the judgment debtor . .
. may request a hearing to claim any exemption to the execution".
(URCP

69(h))

21.

Vance complied with that provision and filed a Request

6

for Hearing on the 6th day of April, 1995. That action began this
matter now under appeal. (See Request

22.

for

Hearing

R712-713)

On April 14, 1995, the trial court initiated a telephone

conference call with counsel for Wilderness and Hubble and Vance
and memorialized the substance thereof in a Minute Entry which
reads:
Telephone call with court, Kent Christiansen & Jeff
Swinton. Counsel agree there is a dispute as to the law
and enter a stipulation that third-party plaintiff's
(sic) to respond by 04-24-95 to initial third-party
memorandum and answer by 04—28—95. The court will then
rule in the law and the parties will determine if an
evidentiary hearing is necessary. (R723 and a copy

attached
23.

to this

Brief

as Exhibit

"A")

On May 2, 1995, counsel for Vance filed a Notice to

Submit for Decision requesting that the court act upon the
memoranda filed.

Vance, as the only party having requested a

hearing, had effectively withdrawn that request by filing the
Notice to Submit.

Copies were sent to opposing counsel. A copy

of the Notice to Submit is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" (R835-

837)
24.

No objection to the Notice to Submit was made nor was a

request for a hearing filed by either counsel for Wilderness and
Hubble or counsel for Robinsons.
25.

(See

file)

Six weeks later, on June 19, 1995, the court, having

received no objections or further requests from counsel, initiated
a

conference

decision.

call

among all three

counsel

to announce

its

The court memorialized the call with a Minute Entry

which reads:
Telephone conference with court, Jeff Swinton, Kent
7

Christiansen and Scott Mitchell.
Motion for claim
exemption of Dennis Vance is granted.
Costs and
attorney fees must come off on his portion and the
attorney's (sic) are to work out the money
amount.
(R840, Exhibit
"J?" to Wilderness
and Hubble1 s
Brief)
26.
19, 1995.

A copy of an Order was circulated among counsel on June
No objections were filed, and three weeks later, on

July 10, 1995, the Order was signed and entered by the court
("July Order").

A copy of the July Order is attached as Exhibit
(R841-843)

"F" to Wilderness and Hubble's Brief.
27.

The

July

Order

resolved

all

legal

issues

and

specifically created a self-effectuating formula for determining
the exemption to which Vance was entitled, requiring that the
parties "attempt to determine, agree and divide among themselves
the amounts to be paid to or retained by each, Robinsons, Vance,
and Hubble." (Exhibit

"F" to Wilderness

and Hubble's

Brief

and

R842)
28.

The trial court anticipated the cooperation of the

parties and did not provide for any additional court involvement,
having instructed the parties to complete the calculations without
court participation.

(R841-843)

29.

The July Order was a final order.

30.

No appeal was taken from the July Order within 30 days

of its entry and Wilderness and Hubble's rights to appeal expired
on August 11, 1995. (See
31.

Failing

to

file)
receive

the

ordered

cooperation

from

Wilderness and Hubble, Vance sought the trial court's supplemental
post-judgment assistance.

Vance filed a document on August 17,

8

1995, entitled "Request for Compliance Order and Determination of
Accounting to Fix Exemption for Vance" which sought to have the
trial

court

enforce

compliance

("Supplemental Request").

On September

its

final

July

Order

A copy of the Supplemental Request is
(R844-854)

attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
32.

with

7, 1995, Scott Mitchell, counsel for

Robinsons, responded to the Supplemental Request indicating that,
Plaintiffs represent that they are ready, willing and
able to provide the requested information in accordance
with the order to the Court
Counsel also clarified the amount of attorney's fees and costs
actually received by him and his clients and the amount retained
(R859-860)

by Vance.

33.

On September 5, 1995, counsel for Wilderness and Hubble

responded to the Supplemental Request by stating that they
. . .would propose to the Court that the terms and
conditions of the settlement agreement be disclosed to
the Court, in camera, and that the Court render its
decision as to what, if any amounts, are due Third-Party
Defendant Vance; thus preserving the confidentiality of
the Wilderness Building Systems, Hubble and Robinsons'
settlement agreement.
(R857)
34.

Acting on the expressed willingness and suggestion of

Wilderness and Hubble, on October 12, 1995, the court invited all
three counsel into chambers to have Wilderness and Hubble, in
camera, disclose the dollar amount of the confidential settlement
agreement

so the parties could calculate the amount of the

exemption as set forth in the final July Order.
25 September
35.

1995,

(See Notice

dated

R876)

As is noted in the Minute Entry of that in-chambers
9

hearing, "The parties agreed on formula, and judgments were
determined." Counsel for Vance was instructed to prepare an order
to document the agreement reached among the parties in the
presence of the trial court.
1995,

attached

36.

hereto

(See

as Exhibit

Minute

"D";

Entry

of

12

October,

R878)

Counsel for Vance prepared the document on October 12,

1995, and

entitled

it

"Judgment on Claim of Dennis Vance"

("Supplement Order"), a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "E" and sent copies to other counsel via facsimile on that
day.

It was signed and entered twelve days later, on October 24,

1995, without objection.
37.

(R879-881)

On October 27, 1995, the Notice of Appeal was filed,

referencing only the court's order "entered in this matter on
October 24, 1995".
38.

(R883-884)

On December 11, 1995, Vance filed a Motion for Summary

Disposition which included a request under Rule 33, URAP, that
this Court determine that this appeal is frivolous, taken for
delay, and interposed for an improper purpose such as to harass
and cause needless increase in the cost of litigation. Ruling on
that Motion was deferred.
39.

(See

file)

Vance, is a debt collector by profession and his income

is generated from commissions or percentage payments from amounts
he personally collects for his clients.
page

2,

R709)

10

(Vance

Affidavit,

\2,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Vance first argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over
the trial court's order of July 10th which was not appealed until
October 27, 1995- The July Order was a "final order" requiring no
further intervention by the court.

Further aid was sought only

because of Wilderness and Hubble's lack of cooperation.

That

resulted in a supplemental judgment issued by the court on October
24, 1996.

Therefore, the appeal was not timely filed.

Vance, a debt collector by profession, entered into an oral
contract with the Robinsons to aid in the collection of a claim
they had against Wilderness and Hubble. Vance was to receive 40%
of all amounts recovered from Wilderness and Hubble, less the
Robinsons' attorney's fees and costs.

A judgment was obtained

against Wilderness and Hubble and collected by Robinsons.

A

judgment was also rendered against Vance and collection efforts of
Wilderness and Hubble through attempted garnishment and ultimately
a court ordered equivalent of garnishment in the form of an order
of attachment on the commission owed to Vance and held by or due
to be paid to Robinsons from Wilderness and Hubble, without
consideration of Vance's statutory exemption, resulted in this
action.
Wilderness and Hubble argue that there was no commission
agreement.
reason.

Vance disagrees, and for good and substantiated
He

understanding

cites
of

all

references
of

to

the

the parties

agreement.
11

record

showing

to the terms

the

of that

Vance argues that the money to which he is entitled, is
"earnings

for

protection

personal

afforded

by

services",
Utah

thereby

Rules

of

subject
Civil

to

the

Procedure

64D(d)(viii)(A) which provides that the maximum amount of his
disposable earnings available for attachment or garnishment is
twenty-five per centum of his disposable earnings.
Wilderness and Hubble waived any rights they had for an
evidentiary hearing on the exemption issue; they participated in
two conference calls with the court and never sought more. After
the court's ruling, Wilderness and Hubble accepted the actions
taken by the trial court without objection, until this appeal.
Finally, Wilderness and Hubble argue that Vance should not be
entitled

to retain anything at all while at the same time

forgetting that the court found Wilderness and Hubble liable for
punitive damages in light of their dealings with the Robinsons.
Vance argues that those demanding equity from a Court must have
clean hands themselves.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE ORDERS SUBMITTED
FOR REVIEW
Wilderness and Hubble's appeal focuses on the July Order.
The July Order was a final order requiring no further intervention
by the trial court.

No appeal was timely taken and this Court

therefore has no jurisdiction to hear it now.

By the time it

became apparent to Vance that Wilderness and Hubble would not
12

voluntarily cooperate with the July Order, the time for appealing
the July Order had expired.
judgment

help

from

the

Vance was required to seek post-

trial

court

which

resulted

in

the

Supplemental Order from which Wilderness and Hubble have appealed.
By this appeal, Wilderness and Hubble are seeking only to
further

delay

the

obligation

to

return

to

Vance

the

money

Wilderness and Hubble wrongfully withheld, which was always exempt
from execution in March of 1995.

They are also attempting to

force Vance to exhaust any hope of personal recovery through his
required payment of attorney's fees to lay claim to his statutory
exemption.
By their contempt of the July Order, Wilderness and Hubble
are now seeking to wrongfully and belatedly capitalize on the
supplemental

involvement

of

themselves, forced upon Vance.

the

trial

court

which

they,

They failed to timely appeal the

final July Order and are now seeking a second bite of the apple by
asking

this

Court

to

integrate

that

July

Order

with

the

Supplemental Order.
In the case of Wheelwright v. Roman, 165 P. 513, 514 (Utah
1917) the Utah State Supreme Court was asked to interpret the
finality of a judgment which declared:
. . .that the deceased was the owner of all of said real
estate at the time of her death, that at said time she
also was the owner of all of the notes and mortgages,
and that the defendant surrender all of said notes and
mortgages to the plaintiff, as administratrix of said
estate, and to account to her for any interest he had
theretofore collected and for the rents and profits
derived by him from said real estate since the death of
the decedent. (Emphasis added)
13

On that occasion, the Court found at 517:
Plaintiff's counsel further contend that, in view that
the judgment requires an accounting to be made by the
defendant, for that reason the judgment is not final,
and hence not appealable.
The contention is not
tenable. What is required from the defendant is a part
of the final judgment. . . The mere fact that the
defendant is ordered to deliver the property to the
plaintiff and to account to her for the interest that he
may have collected on the notes and mortgages, etc.,
does not affect the finality of the judgment. (Emphasis
added)
The Wheelwright analysis parallels the facts of this case.
What was required of the parties in this action—to sit down and
determine among themselves how the money should be divided—was "a
part of the final judgment". In the Wheelwright case, accounting
"for any interest he had theretofore collected and for the rents
and profits derived by him from said real estate since the death
of the decedent" clearly required some analysis and discussion
among the parties but was not contemplated to have involved the
court.

Based upon that, the 1917 order was final.

In like

manner, the July Order in this case was final and the right to
appeal could not be extended by the intentional failure on the
part of Wilderness and Hubble to comply with the ministerial
functions the trial court delegated to the parties and their
counsel.
Although what remained to be done by the parties in our case
was not technically an "accounting", there are cases in Utah which
may

be

viewed

as

similar

to

this

in

that

they

address

circumstances where an accounting remained to be provided.
have found that the order appealed from is interlocutory.
14

Some
Those

cases include, however, either one or both of the following
elements not found in our case.

Either they are actions wherein

an accounting is a part of the actual relief being sought (See
Meagher v. Equity Oil Company, 299 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956)); or, it
is anticipated

at

the time of

the order

that

the court's

subsequent involvement or later determination will be required
(See Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah
1986) ) .
Vance did not seek an accounting, only a determination of his
entitlement to an exemption and the court granted that request.
Further, the court asked the parties to calculate the numbers
among themselves with no reference to or anticipation of any later
court determination.

The court's later involvement was not the

result of unfinished work by the court, but of contempt of the
court's

July

Order

by

Wilderness

and

Hubble.

Ultimately

Wilderness and Hubble volunteered to provide the information, in
camera, and the court granted that request in October, 1995.
Even in the Meagher case cited above, the court held at 831
that although the portion of the order dealing with the requested
accounting was viewed as interlocutory, "the judgment is final
insofar as it determines the rights of the parties hereto in the
Sheridan lease."

Utah follows the general rule nationally, and

the Meagher case, supra, is cited for that proposition in 3 ALR 2d
342, Later Case Service at page 300.

The general proposition

noted at 346 in the body of the annotation which reads:
. most courts recognize the general rule that
finality for purposes of appeal is not necessarily
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destroyed by reason of a provision for future
accountingThe determinative factor is whether the
equities have been finally adjudicated or the rights of
the parties ascertained and finally determined.
Therefore, the determination in the July Order that Vance's
commission under his agreement with the Robinsons is earnings from
personal services and that the maximum amount of his disposable
earnings available for attachment or garnishment is twenty-five
per centum of his disposable earnings is fixed, final, and no
longer subject to appeal, (See URCP 64D(d) (viii)

(A))

The time for

appealing the July Order passed without an extension sought or
granted.
The

July

Order went

substantive legal issue.

even

further

than

ruling

on the

It went into some detail to set forth

the formula under which the numbers could be determined among the
parties.

It required the deduction of all amounts owed back to

the Robinsons by Vance for their attorney's fees and costs under
their agreement and it further required that Vance's aggregate
disposable earnings available for attachment or garnishment be
"calculated in accordance with this order under Rule 64D (d)
(viii) (A), URCP."
The ALR citation, supra, at 373-374 addresses circumstances
where the order fixes the principles under which the account is to
be taken.

There appears to be no Utah case on point and the ALR

citation notes that most of the cases on that point have arisen in
Illinois where it has generally been held that
"a decree which determines the equities in controversy
is final for purposes of appeal, where it fixes the
rules and principles upon which the account is to be
16

made." (Empha sis added)
If Wilderness and Hubble had felt that the July Order was
confusing

or

required

further

clarification

for

its proper

interpretation, Wilderness and Hubble could and should have filed
a Motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure within 10 days after the entry of the
judgment.

They did not.

They could have appealed it within 30

days after the entry of judgment-

They did not.

Now they are

essentially seeking a retroactive extension of time to appeal the
July Order.
The

It is not warranted in the law.

Supplemental

Order was

a post-judgment

matter

not

originally contemplated by the July Order and was necessitated by
the intentional disregard of the July Order by Wilderness and
Hubble.

The Supplemental Order, although titled as a Judgment to

give it legal teeth, was merely the written representation of an
agreement among counsel voluntarily entered into in the presence
of the trial
objection.

judge.

There is nothing

from which

to draw

Again, if Wilderness and Hubble had felt that the

Supplemental Order was confusing or required further clarification
for its proper interpretation, Wilderness and Hubble could and
should have filed a Motion to alter or amend the judgment under
Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure within 10 days after the
entry of the judgment.

They did not.

They have now cast the

burden upon this Court.
Counsel for Wilderness and Hubble now complains that the
court should not have compelled Wilderness and Hubble's counsel to
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disclose any information relating to the "confidential" settlement
agreement between Wilderness and Hubble and Robinsons.

He seems

to have forgotten his own words written on September 5, 1995,
wherein he responded to the Supplemental Request with a courtfiled document stating that his clients...
. . .would propose to the Court that the terms and
conditions of the settlement agreement be disclosed to
the Court in cameraf and that the Court render its
decision as to what, if any amounts, are due Third-Party
Defendant Vance; thus preserving the confidentiality of
the Wilderness Building Systems, Hubble and Robinsons'
settlement agreement.
(R857)
His request became the court's command.
meeting was scheduled by the court.

An "in camera"

Counsel for Wilderness and

Hubble then sat in that meeting with the other attorneys in this
case on October 12, 1995. There is no evidence in the record that
he asked the court then for "an opportunity at hearing to present
evidence supporting the grounds and reasons for maintaining the
confidential

nature of the settlement agreement" as he now

suggests on appeal should have occurred.
Hubble'

s Brief

at 9-10

and Minute

Entry

(See

at R878)

Wilderness

and

He did not raise

that issue earlier in his responsive Memorandum filed on September
5, 1995.

(Fact

#33,

above,

and R857)

He noted no objection for

the record to the numbers agreed upon by the parties and which
counsel for Vance was instructed to put in judgment form.

The

actual Supplemental Order was transmitted via facsimile to counsel
for Wilderness and Hubble on October 12 and no objection was
voiced or filed.

It was not until 12 days later that the

Supplemental Order was signed and entered.
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Again, no response.

Counsel for Wilderness and Hubble had outlined the procedure for
the court and indicated that if it were followed, it would
preserve,

in

his words,

"the confidentiality

of

Wilderness

Building Systems, Hubble and Robinsons' settlement agreement".
There has been no violation of the confidential nature of the
agreement

except

to

the

extent

volunteered

by

counsel

for

Wilderness and Hubble,
The Supplemental Order is not a "judgment" in the sense
contemplated by the law. It is an agreement among attorneys that
received court approval, entitled

"judgment" for purposes of

collection. This Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from
a

joint agreement among parties, even if it is entitled a

"judgment".

Therefore, this entire appeal should be summarily

dismissed.
Finally, this appeal is either, or both, frivolous or taken
for delay.

The pattern of conduct leading up to this appeal

illustrates

the

degree

of

foot-dragging,

gamesmanship,

and

contempt of the trial court's order displayed by Wilderness and
Hubble.

The appeal from the July Order has no merit at all. The

weak basis under which the appeal has been brought—particularly
in light of the attempted belated integration of the July Order
speaks volumes regarding true motive.
Wilderness and Hubble are keenly aware of the extended cost
of this action, which began merely with a Request for Hearing to
determine Vance's right to an exemption to sustain life.

Vance

was successful under the legal theory, however, Wilderness and
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Hubble have been careful to ensure that every dollar to which
Vance is entitled is consumed by attorney's fees.
As a result, under Rule 33, URAP, Vance respectfully requests
that this Court order that he receive, from either Wilderness and
Hubble or their counsel, costs, which include damages, doubled,
and his reasonable attorney's fees in this matter.
II. VANCE IS ENTITLED TO 40% OF ALL AMOUNTS CREDITED TO
ROBINSONS FROM WILDERNESS AND HUBBLE.
Wilderness and Hubble argue that there was no agreement for
Vance to receive 40% of the amounts recovered by Robinsons from
him.

In support of their argument, Wilderness and Hubble point

out apparent inconsistencies in the trial and deposition testimony
of Vance throughout these proceedings.

Taken out of context,

inconsistencies appear, but the actions of Wilderness and Hubble
prior to the allegations in their Brief say just the opposite.
Wilderness and Hubble are attempting to hide that from this Court.
(See Wilderness

and Hubble's

Brief,

Fact #7 at page

2.)

On September 20, 1994, Wilderness and Hubble filed a document
with the trial court entitled "Memorandum in Support of Motion for
and Order of Execution Against Payment Proceeds Pursuant to
U.R.C.P. Rule 69" (R383-387)

("September Memo").

That was where

Wilderness and Hubble made the argument to the trial court that
they were entitled to execute on the 40% payment claim which Vance
was entitled to receive from Robinsons.

In that Memorandum

Wilderness and Hubble commented upon the clarity of Vance's
deposition testimony:
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4.
During his deposition of April 13, 1992,
Third-Party Defendant Vance also indicated that he and
the Robinsons had agreed that he would receive forty
percent (40%) of any funds collected against the
Defendants relative to the lawsuit. (September Memo,
page 3—emphasis added; R385)
In the September Memo, Wilderness and Hubble further stressed
the trial testimony to support their claim for Vance's money.
3.
The evidence presented at the June 1, 1994
trial revealed that Dennis Vance entered into an
agreement with the Robinsons prior to the commencement
of this lawsuit wherein he would receive a percentage of
any recovery they might obtain from Defendants Kerry
Rick Hubble, Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. or Kevin
Kay Gneiting."
R385)

(September

Memo, page

3--emphasis

added;

Now, ironically, Wilderness and Hubble have done a flip-flop,
have

either

ignored

or

forgotten

their

conclusions filed in September, 1994.

own

statements

and

Today in their Brief at

page 8 they twist the facts and say:
During the June 1, 1994 trial of this matter,
Dennis Vance also testified uneguivocally that there was
no agreement between he and the Robinsons relative to
this case. (Emphasis added)
Look who's talking about inconsistencies. Even the Robinsons
have acknowledged that such an agreement exists. (See Fact

#14)

Robinsons' counsel filed a Response to Vance's claim for an
exemption on the 14th day of April 1995, and admitted that there
was an agreement, and that attorneys fees and costs should be
taken from it.

If there were no such agreement then why did

counsel for Wilderness and Hubble author the language in the
Amended Order, entered on March 13, 1995, which reads:
". . . it is ordered that any and all sums due and
owing by Plaintiffs Leon and Arlene Robinson to said
Third-Party Defendant, Dennis Vance are attached and
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shall be applied towards the satisfaction of Third-Party
Plaintiff's judgments against Third-Party Defendant."
(Order at pages 2-3;
R658-660)
Certainly there was an agreement.

Vance is entitled to

recover and is further entitled to claim his rightful exemption.
III. UTAH AND THE VAST MAJORITY OF COURTS RECOGNIZE AN
EXEMPTION FOR EARNINGS FROM PERSONAL SERVICES SIMILAR TO THOSE
PROVIDED BY VANCE
Wilderness and Hubble have attempted to persuade this Court
to follow a small minority of other jurisdictions, using cases
that are dissimilar, and overlooking entirely what has been said
about this issue in the State of Utah.

The issue for this Court

is simple. Is the money to which Vance is entitled, "earnings for
personal services"?
Wilderness and Hubble would have this Court stumble over
whether

the money

is

"wages" or whether it is

"disposable

earnings", whether Vance is an "independent contractor" or an
"employee", and finally suggest that this Court make its decision
on the good old "strong policy consideration" argument in light of
Vance's conduct.
Vance was clearly "self-employed". He retained the services
of no other person or entity in his arrangement with Robinsons
except, perhaps, their attorney. The commission or percentage to
which he is entitled was based solely upon his own efforts.
Wilderness and Hubble's arguments are all red-herrings designed to
cause this Court to look beyond the mark.
Initially, let's examine the policy considerations for the
exemption law in the first place.
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Wilderness and Hubble admit

that

Utah's

law

and

federal

law

under

the

Consumer

Protection Act are "almost identical". (Wilderness
Brief

at

page

8)

and

Credit
Hubble's

Much of the interpretation of the federal law

and also states' laws is found in issues before federal bankruptcy
courts which must look to the applicable state law for governance.
In the case of In re Duncan, 140 B.R. 210 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Tenn.
1992)

the

court

was

faced

with

a

claimed

exemption

for

an

insurance renewal commission that came to the debtor after he
ceased working for the insurance company, but based upon prior
sales.

The

court

honored

the

claimed

exemption

(which

is

important in and of itself) but even more interesting is the
analysis the court followed, which should be a map for this Court.
The court said:
The only issues before the court are the trustee's
contentions that the exemption is available only to
employees rather than to independent contractors such as
the debtor, and that, even if the exemption is available
to independent contractors, the renewal commission at
issue do not constitute compensation for personal
services as required by Tenn. Code Section 26-2-105
(1980) .
Because there is no Tennessee case law dispositive
of either issue raised by the trustee, it is necessary
to look to other jurisdictions for guidance.
The
analysis is made easier because state wage garnishment
exemption statutes must comply with the federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act. Consequently, the language of
most
state wage
garnishment
exemption
statutes,
Tennessee included, is substantially identical to the
language of 15 U.S.C.A. Sections 1672 and 1673 (West
1982)
There is a split of authority as to whether the
exemption statute applies to independent contractors.
Some courts have relied on the language of the statute
and the congressional intent behind the federal act to
deny protection other than to wage earners in an
employee-employer relationship. . . . However, other
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courts, relying on identical statutory language and
their interpretation of the congressional intent have
extended protection to independent contractors.
...
This court finds the latter line of cases to be
persuasive.
The intent of Congress in its enactment of
Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is
best stated by the Act itself. Section 1671 of title
15, entitled "Congressional findings and declaration of
purpose", provides in part:
(a) The Congress finds:
(1) The unrestricted garnishment
of compensation due for personal services
encourages the making of predatory extensions
of credit. Such extensions of credit divert
money into excessive credit payments and
thereby hinder the production and flow of
goods in interstate commerce.
(2) The application of garnishment
as a creditor's remedy frequently results in
loss of employment by the debtor, and the
resulting
disruption
of
employment,
production, and consumption constitutes a
substantial burden on interstate commerce.
(3) The great disparities among
the laws of the several States relating to
garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the
uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and
frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas
of the country.
(b) On the basis of the findings stated
in subsection (a) of this section, the
Congress determines that the provisions of
this subchapter are necessary and proper for
the purpose of carrying into execution the
powers of the Congress to regulate commerce
and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.
15 U.S.C.A. Section 1671 (West 1982)
The Duncan court then concluded:
Clearly, the intent of Congress in its enactment of
Subchapter II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act was
to grant an exemption to wage earners from the burden of
garnishments, to protect employment of wage earners, and
to prevent bankruptcies. It was to grant relief for the
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wage earner debtors and "more particularly for his
family," against economically destructive garnishments.
• These concerns apply equally to individuals
working as independent contractors as well as those
engaged in traditional employee relationships. Marian
Health Center v. Cooks, 451 N.W.2d at 848. Further, the
language of the statute simply does not limit its effect
to employees. "Earnings" include all compensation for
personal services, including commissions. Tenn Code Ann.
Section 26-2-105(1980). Therefore, the exemption is
available to independent contractors to the extent that
the compensation sought to be garnished is for personal
services. (Id. at 212-213) (emphasis added)
In the case of Matter of Glickman, 126 B.R. 124 (Bkrtcy. M.D.
Fla.

1991)

a

Florida

bankruptcy

court

also

held

that

an

independent contractor is entitled to the exemption, reemphasized
the reasoning of the Duncan court, and added some of its own.
The Statute does not limit the term "payment of any
money or other thing due" to wages alone. The Statute
also does not limit the term "person" to an employee as
opposed to an independent contractor.
To read the
Statute otherwise might render it unconstitutional as
discriminating between different classes receiving
compensation. See White at 533.
The purpose of the exemption laws is to prevent the
unfortunate citizen from being deprived of the
necessaries of life and to preserve for him and his
family certain things reasonably necessary to enable him
to earn a livelihood, and, where his livelihood is
produced by his personal labor and services, to so
protect him and his family that such earnings may not be
taken from them and they be left destitute and a charge
upon charity.
The rule appears to be in almost all jurisdictions
that exemption statutes should be liberally construed in
favor of the debtor that the very purpose of the statute
in preserving to the unfortunate debtor and his family
means of living without becoming a charge upon the
public may be accomplished. (Id. at 126) (emphasis added
in the first paragraph only)
The court went on to reiterate that, as in Utah, "Nothing in
the Statute limits its operation to employees." (Id. at 126-127)
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This interpretation of the intention of the Statutes is not
limited to bankruptcy courts. In the case of Marian Health Center
v. Cooks, 451 N.W.2d 846 (Iowa App. 1989) cited above, the court
held:
The phrase "personal services" as used by the
legislature means wages for work done by the person.
This was intended to distinguish it from certificates of
deposit or other investments.
The intent of the
legislature could not have been to distinguish employees
from independent contractors.
One of the express
purposes of the statute is to prevent bankruptcies and
the predatory extension of credit.
Garnishing an
independent contractor's income to exhaustion will
result in bankruptcy as surely as it will with an
employee. . . . The income of the appellant is protected
by the Iowa exemption law."
(Id. at 848) (emphasis
added)
Speaking once again to the issue of renewal commissions, the
court in First Nat. Bank of Guthrie v. Brown, 579 P.2d 825 (Okl.
1978) held:
We view such commissions as deferred compensation
for making the initial sale and as an incentive to
encourage the insurance agents to service their
customers, in order to encourage renewals. Thus, the
commissions constitute compensation for personal
services, and accordingly come within the definition of
"earnings". (Id at 827)
There is nothing in the Utah statute that distinguishes
between employees and independent contractors.

There is nothing

in it that mandates that "periodic earnings" must mean weekly,
monthly, or even yearly.

Remember, even the renewal commissions

of a retired insurance agent (never an employee of the company)—
whenever they are paid—are exempt.
Even

if

the

points

made

persuasive is Utah law itself.

above were

not

enough, most

In the Utah case of Russell M.
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Miller Company v. Givan, 325 P. 2d 908

(Utah

1958) the court

reiterated the theme represented above:
It seems clear beyond dispute that the language of
the statute "earnings of the judgment debtor for his
personal services," is intended to have a broader
application than the restrictive meaning of the phrase
"wages of a laborer" which the plaintiff seeks to place
thereon.
This idea is implemented by the generally
approved rule that exemption statutes are liberally
construed in favor of the debtor to protect him and his
family from hardship.
The fact that the debtor may use some capital or
credit, tools or equipment, or automobiles or other
property as an aid in producing such income would not
deprive him of the benefit of the exemption allowed by
law. Even if the plaintiff had shown, as he contends,
that part of the defendant's income was a return on
capital investment, or that other elements than the
efforts of the debtor actually produced part of the
income, defendant would still be entitled to his
exemption on the portion of his income representing
reasonable compensation for his efforts, provided it
could be ascertained. (Id at 909-910)
THIS IS THE LAW IN UTAH.

Not many states have their own

controlling case-law, but Utah does, and it should be followed.
Wilderness and Hubble have brought to this Court's attention
the few cases that lean in favor in their theory, however, they
fall woefully short in terms of persuasive impact.

The cases

cited by Wilderness and Hubble can be easily distinguished.
In the case of Funk v. Utah State Tax Com'n 839 P. 2d 818
(Utah 1992) the court dealt with the issue of whether a state tax
refund was viewed as disposable earnings subject to the exemption.
There the court ruled in harmony with every other court in the
nation, including the case of Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S.642
(1974) also cited by Wilderness and Hubble.
the issue was a federal income tax refund.
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In the Kokoszka case
The rationale for

those two cases and which does not control the issues currently
before this Court, is articulated in the Funk case as follows:
The Kokoszka rationale regarding the CCPA applies
equally to the almost identical language of Rule
64D(d)(vii). Wage earners generally do not rely on tax
refunds as a means of support to the same extent that
they rely on periodic payments of compensation. . . Most
people do not budget tax refunds into their regular
living expenses.
Thus, allowing garnishment of an
entire tax refund by creditors would not place the type
of hardship on a debtor that Rule 64D and the CCPA seek
to avoid. (Funk at 821) (emphasis added)
Wilderness and Hubble stretch in every way possible to make
the Funk and Kokoszka cases cover the factual foundation of
Vance's claim. They suggest that "the Robinson judgment is within
the very same class of claims" as set forth in those cases.

In

summary, Wilderness and Hubble state: "Vance's claim is clearly
not wages, salary, or regular commission earned on a week-to-week,
month-to-month, or even year-to-year basis." They are right. It
isn't—but it doesn't need to be.

In spite of Wilderness and

Hubble's efforts to confuse the Court, that definition is simply
not the standard. The standard is found in Rule 64D(d)(vii), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
"Earnings" or "earnings for personal services" means
compensation paid or payable for personal services
whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus
or otherwise . . . "
Any modification or embellishment of that definition by Wilderness
and Hubble should be ignored.
Two other cases cited by Wilderness and Hubble in earlier
memoranda are wholly without impact.

Anticipating they may be

added on Reply, we address them briefly here.
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In the case of

Coones v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 796 P.2d 803 (Wyo. 1990) the
court found that profits received from the sale of livestock and
crops were not covered by that state's exemption statute.

The

court distinguished those profits and business earnings, passed on
only secondarily to the owners, as different from "compensation
paid or payable for personal services", inasmuch as the owners had
no obligation to pay themselves out of the operation of the farm
and ranch.

In our case, the obligation to pay was on a third

party—the Robinsons—and was not controlled by Vance.
In the case of Coward v. Smith, 636 P.2d 793 (Kan. 1981) the
Kansas court likened Smith's independent contractor status to the
operator of a business.

Smith had hired 6 or 7 other people to

help him in the project. The court's definition of an independent
contractor in the Coward case was one who,
. . .generally employs others to perform the labor
end his compensation includes more than compensation for
his personal services. It includes personal services
performed by the contractor's employees, reimbursement
for equipment used, and a return on capital." (Id. at
796)
Even if it were on point, the Miller v. Givan case, supra, in
Utah specifically overrules application of that Kansas case in
this

state.

If Vance

is characterized

contractor", it is only for tax purposes.
discussed in the Coward case.

as an

"independent

He is not the sort

He has no employees; provides no

equipment; and, does not receive a return on capital.

He keeps

what he earns as compensation for his—and only his—personal
services.
Vance makes his living by helping others collect debts that
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are owed them and taking a percentage of the recovery.
#39,

Affidavit

R710)

(See

Fact

He has no assurance if, when, and how much

will be recovered, but when it does come, it is his sole source of
income.

Some recoveries are larger than others but that is not a

basis for denying an exemption. There is no law to that effect—
anywhere.
IV. REGARDLESS OF THE SEMANTICS OF GARNISHMENT OR EXECUTION,
WILDERNESS AND HUBBLE SOUGHT THE SAME THING USING BOTH LABELS.
WILDERNESS AND HUBBLE WAIVED ANY RIGHTS TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Wilderness and Hubble attempt to make something out of the
fact that although a garnishment was issued, none was served.
Instead, both before and after the issuance of the Writ of
Garnishment, Wilderness and Hubble went directly to the Court and
sought garnishment's equivalent—an Order of Execution against
Vance's earnings in the possession of the Robinsons—which was
viewed as in their September Memo (R383-387) as the same thing.
In the September Memo Wilderness and Hubble state:
5.
Third-Party Plaintiffs assert that they are
entitled to a garnishment order against any and all sums
due Dennis Blaine Vance from Leon and Arlene Robinson.
(September Memo at page 3; R385)
They sought a garnishment order and received its equivalent
in the Amended Order signed by this Court attaching property of
Vance in the possession of a third party.

It was not required

that Vance be "served with a notice of execution". The Order was
granted in open court in the presence of counsel for the Robinsons
and Vance, personally appearing pro se. Based upon that "notice"
in open court, followed up with the March 13, 1995, Amended Order
30

which was sent to Vance (without mention of his exemption rights),
Vance filed a Request for Hearing (See Request
713).

On April

for

Hearing

14, 1995, the court initiated

R712-

a telephone

conference call with counsel for Wilderness and Hubble and Vance
and set a timeline for briefing the issues. Memoranda were filed
and evidence was presented by affidavits.
On May 2, 1995, counsel for Vance filed a Notice to Submit
for Decision requesting that the court act upon the memoranda and
affidavits filed.

Vance, as the only party having requested a

hearing, had effectively withdrawn that request by filing the
Notice to Submit.
objected.

Copies were sent to opposing counsel.

No one requested a hearing.

No one

The court waited for six

weeks—until, on June 19, 1995, the court initiated a conference
call among all three counsel to announce its decision. A copy of
an Order was circulated among counsel on June 19, 1995.

No

objections were filed, and three weeks later, on July 10, 1995,
the Order was signed and entered by the court.

Only now, a year

later on appeal, do we hear Wilderness and Hubble say they "were
never

afforded

the

opportunity

to

present

evidence

and/or

testimony concerning the existence or nonexistence of Vance's
claimed entitlement...". (See
page

6,

and Fact

#10 at page

Wilderness
2)

and

Hubble's

Brief

That simply is not true.

at
They

never sought the opportunity and did not complain thereafter—
until this appeal.

If Wilderness and Hubble were prejudiced by

the lack of a hearing, they should begin the discussion by looking
to themselves and their counsel.
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V.

EQUITY DEMANDS EQUITY

It appears rather clear from the file that the trial court
felt a need to penalize Vance—but only after it had first
penalized Wilderness and Hubble.

Now Wilderness and Hubble

innocently point to Vance as "the perpetrator and orchestrator of
(Wilderness

a scheme to defraud all of the parties in this case".
and

Hubble's

Brief

at

page

14)

Wilderness

and

Hubble

are

attempting to sway the Court's emotions beyond the boundaries of
the law by suggesting that there is
consideration
(Wilderness

against

and Hubble's

the

allowance

Brief

at page

"a very strong policy

14)

of

Vance's

claim".

What Wilderness and

Hubble seem to forget, and one would hope is not lost on this
Court, is that it was Wilderness and Hubble who were found to have
defrauded the Robinsons in the first instance.

Furthermore, the

same judge who found against Vance on the underlying claim,
maturely distanced himself from his feelings toward Vance and
ruled that Vance was entitled to an exemption as a matter of law.
In their final attack, Wilderness and Hubble conclude their
Brief with:

"To allow him to escape the economic consequences of

his wrongful acts, and indeed compensate him therefore (sic), goes
against every tenet of fairness and justice."
calling the kettle "black".

This is the pot

A large judgment remains in place

against Vance and is sufficient punishment. By denying Vance the
minimum protection of his statutorily granted exemption, this
Court would be allowing Wilderness and Hubble to benefit further
from their fraud.
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One demanding equity from a Court must have clean hands
himself.

Equity demands equity.

Even if equity were rightfully

deserved, which it is not, such cannot override the statutory
right Vance has to this Court's protection of his exemption from
execution.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Vance respectfully requests that
this Court either refuse to hear this appeal based upon the July
Order, or, if addressed, to affirm the, careful, methodical, and
mature decision of the trial court and award Vance his costs,
which include damages, doubled, and his reasonable attorney fees
in this matter.
Respectfully submitted this 1 ~~ day of June, 1996.
STOKER & SWINTON
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Attorneys for Appellants
345 IBM Plaza
420 East South Temple
Salt Lake
Yj
lh 84111
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EXHIBIT "A"

EXHWT k

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

ROBINSON, LEON W
PLAINTIFF
VS
GNEITING, KAY

CASE NUMBER 920902754 CV
DATE 04/17/95
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK DAG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

TELEPHONE CALL WITH THE COURT, KENT CHRISTIANSEN & JEFF SWINTON
COUNSEL AGREE THERE IS A DISPUTE AS TO THE LAW AND ENTER
A STIPULATION THAT THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF'S TO RESPOND BY
04-24-95 TO INITIAL THIRD-PARTY MEMORANDUM AND ANSWER TO BY
04-28-95. THE COURT WILL THEN RULE IN THE LAW AND THE PARTIES
WILL DETERMINE IF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY.

D9723

EXHIBIT "B"

EXHIBIT B
Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178
STOKER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant Dennis Vance
311 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-4000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LEON W. ROBINSON and
ARLENE ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.
a Utah corporation,

NOTICE TO SUBMIT
FOR
DECISION

Defendants.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 920902754

vs.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

DENNIS VANCE,
Third Party Defendant.
COMES NOW, Dennis Vanoe, by and through his attorney of
record, Jeffrey C. Swinton, of the law firm of Stoker & Swinton,
and respectfully requests this Court to act upon the Memoranda on
file herein regarding the exemption claim of Dennis Vance.

The

matter has now been fully briefed and is ready for this Court's
consideration.

0 hos U o

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of May, 1995.
STOKER & SWINTON

/xnton
Third Party
idant Dennis Vance

2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the ZJ*-

day of May,

1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to Submit was
mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Kent L. Christiansen
Christiansen & Sonntag
420 E. South Temple, #345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Scott B. Mitchell
Lehman, Jensen & Donahue
8 East 300 South, #620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael G. Barker
56 East Broadway, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT "C"

EXHIBIT G
Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178
STOKER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant Dennis Vance
311 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-4000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LEON W. ROBINSON and
ARLENE ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.
a Utah corporation,

REQUEST FOR COMPLIANCE
ORDER AND DETERMINATION
OF ACCOUNTING TO FIX
EXEMPTION FOR VANCE

Defendants.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 920902754
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

DENNIS VANCE,
Third Party Defendant.
COMES NOW, Dennis Vance, by and through his counsel, and
requests an Order from this Court compelling compliance with its
Order dated July 10, 1995 ("Order") and fixing the amount of cash
to which Vance is entitled thereunder.
On July 10, 1995, this Court signed an Order which created a
formula for determining the exemption to which Vance was entitled.

it .0 ti "U 8 4 <i

A copy of that Order is attached hereto % as Exhibit

"A" and

specifically required that the parties "attempt to determine, agree
and divide among themselves the amounts to be paid to or retained
by each, Robinsons, Vande, and Hubble."
On July 10, 1995, counsel for Vance sent a letter to counsel
for Robinsons and Hubble, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B". In response, counsel for Robinsons sent a letter on
July 12, 1995, to counsel for Hubble, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "C". On July 13, 1995, counsel for Hubble sent
a letter to counsel for Vance, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit "D". On July 14, 1995, counsel for Vance responded to the
July 13th letter and gave counsel for Hubble until July 19, 1995,
to obtain his clients' cooperation to share information from their
confidential agreement sufficient to allow compliance with this
Court's Order. (See Exhibit "E")
Follow-up conversations have produced nothing except the
confirmation from counsel for Robinsons that their attorneys fees
totalled $19,140.66. Vance is entitled to his exemption and cash
is being wrongfully retained by either counsel for Hubble or
Robinsons.
Therefore, Vance respectfully requests this Court to do the
following:
1.

Require counsel for Hubble and Robinsons to disclose the

total amount of consideration passing pursuant to the confidential
agreement (coupled with prior garnishments) referred to among the
parties.
2
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2.

After determining the total consideration paid by Hubble

to the Robinsons, multiplying that figure by 40% to determine the
fee to which Vance was entitled.
3.

After determining the fee to which Vance is entitled,

subtracting therefrom $19,140.66 for the attorney's fees and costs
paid to Robinsons' counsel as required by paragraph 2 of the Order.
4.

After determining the balance to which Vance is entitled

after payment of the attorneys fees and costs, determining the
amount of the remainder which is "disposable earnings" under Utah
Law, allowing a deduction for the amounts required by law to be
withheld from a sole proprietor for taxes, and awarding Vance that
specific amount.
5.

After deducting the amount paid to/ Vance for taxes,

multiplying the remainder by 25% to determine the amount to which
Hubble is entitled and ordering the remaining 75% to be paid
forthwith to Vance.
6.

Granting Vance his attorney's fees and costs for the time

required in bringing this Request and interest on the amount
awarded accruing from July 10, 1995 until paid in full.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

(5^day of August, 1995.
STOKER & SWINTON

Jeffrey tr. Y^winton
A^tornew^tor Dennis Vance
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING*
/£

The undersigned hereby verifies that on the

- day of

August, 1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Request was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Kent L. Christiansen
Christiansen & Sonntag
420 E. South Temple, #345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Scott B. Mitchell
Lehman, Jensen & Donahue
8 East 300 South, #620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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^ D I S T R I C T COURT
Third Judicial District

Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178
STOKER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant Dennis Vance
311 South State Stre'et, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-4000

.Mil 1 0)995
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By
Onnuly Ctork

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LEON W. ROBINSON and
ARLENE ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.
a Utah corporation,

ORDER ON CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
OF DENNIS VANCE

Defendants.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 920902754

vs.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

DENNIS VANCE,
Third Party Defendant.
TKis matter was presented by Memoranda filed by Jeffrey C.
Swinton of the law firm of Stoker & Swinton, on behalf of the
movant,

Third

Party

Defendant, Dennis Vance

("Vance"), with

responsive Memoranda filed by Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm
of Christiansen & Sonntag on behalf of Third Party Plaintiffs,
Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. ("Hubble"),

0 0
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and by Scott Mitchell on behalf of Plaintiffs, Leon and Arlene
Robinson ("Robinsons").
The Court, in a conference call in which all three counsel
participated on June 19, 1995, announced its decision.

The Court

having read all Memoranda and being fully advised in the premises,
and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that,
1.

The commission to which Dennis Vance is entitled under

his agreement with the Robinsons

is

"earnings

from personal

services" within the meaning of Rule 64D(d)(vii), URCP;
2.

This Court requires the deduction of all amounts owed to

Robinsons by Vance for their attorneys' fees and costs under their
agreement with Vance to be deducted before arriving at the amount
of Vance's

"disposable earnings" within

the meaning of Rule

64D(d)(vii), URCP;
3.

The maximum

amount of Vance's

aggregate disposable

earnings available for attachment or garnishment by Hubble is
"twenty-five per centum" of his "disposable earnings" calculated in
accordance with this Order under Rule 64D(d)(viii)(A), URCP; and,
4.

The parties shall attempt to determine, agree and divide

among themselves the amounts to be paid to or retained by each,
Robinsons, Vance, and Hubble.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
V

The undersigned hereby verifies that on the

(^ -

day of

June, 1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was
mailed by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Kent L. Christiansen
Christiansen & Sonntag
420 E. South Temple, #345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Scott B. Mitchell
Judge Building, Suite 620
8 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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LAW O F F I C E S

STOKER & SWINTON
STEPHEN G. STOKER. P.C.
JEFFREY C. SWIIMTON. P.C.

k PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

TELECOPIER
IS0U3S9-6603

311 SOUTH STATE STREET. SUITE * C O
S A L T LAKE CITY. U T A H S A I I I
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 0 3 5 9 - 4 0 0 0

July 10, 1995

Kent L. Christiansen
Christiansen & Sonntag
420 E South Temple, #345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Scott B. Mitchell
Judge Building, Suite 620
8 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Kent and Scott:
Enclosed please find the Order which I sent to you on the 19th
of June, 1995 which has now been signed on the! 10th of July, 1995
by Judge Wilkinson.
As you were aware, the court has asked that we determine,
agree and divide among ourselves the amounts to be paid or retained
by each of our clients.
In light of this I would appreciate
knowing the details of the settlement agreement between your
clients and the amount of consideration given the Robinsons.
Please communicate with me before Friday, July 14.
Sincerely,

SWINTON
JCS:js
Enclosure
ccz
Dennis Vance

•fl'(M*S5 1

EXHIBIT « <

Scott B. Mitchell
<z/ft£oiruu at Jlavj
SUITE 620 JUDGE BUILDING
8 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

^ o i r B #<m4 x o e o 4 _. c
TELECOPIER: (801) 363-1715

w i p

TELEPHONE: (801) 532-7858

July 12, 1995

Kent L. Christiansen
420 E. South Temple, Suite 345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Hubble v. Vance
Dear Kent:
In response to Jeff Swinton's letter of July 10, 1995, and
in accordance with the Stipulated Settlement, Satisfaction, and
Release of .All Claims on file with the court, you are hereby
notified of; Vance's demand for details regarding our clients1
settlement agreement. At your earliest convenience, please let
me know how you intend to respond.

. Mitchell
SBM:km
cc: Jeffrey Swinton

0 U 0 8 5 2 EXHIBIT C

K E N T L CHRISTIANSENf
JAMES L SONNTAG*
SYLVIA O KRALIK

LAW OFFICES

fALSO ADMITTED TO THE
COLORADO BAR

CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG

L U C Y L SONNTAG*

^REGISTERED PATENT
345 IBM PLAZA

ATTORNEY

420 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
RANDY J CHRISTIANSEN
of Counsel

ALSO ADMITTED

TO THE NEW YORK BAR

SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111

•REGISTERED PATENT

TELEPHONE (801) 359 3762

AGENT

FACSIMILE (801) 359 3763

NOT ADMITTED

TO THE BAR

July 13, 1995

Jeffrey C. Swinton
STOKER & SWINTON
311 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE: Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Dennis Vance
Dear Jeff:
Thank you for your letter of July 10, 1995. I have discussed the substance of your letter
with my clients and they, have expressed to me their need for verifipation of any agreement that
existed between Vance and the Robinsons. In addition, there was a confidentiality provision in
the settlement agreement that still needs to be addressed.
I would appreciate receiving a copy of the signed agreement between Vance and the
Robinsons evidencing his claim for compensation, and any other documentation or verification
that such an agreement indeed existed. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance in this
matter. I look forward to hearing from you.
Very truly yours^
CHRISTIANSEN^ SONNTAG

KLC/br
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EXHIBIT I!

LAW OFFICES

STOKER & SWINTON%
k, PARTNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

S T E P H E N G. STOKER P.C.
JEFFREY C. SWINTON. P.C.

TELECOPIER
<80J)359-e603

311 SOUTH STATE STREET. SUITE AOO
SALT LAKE CITY. U T A H & 4 I I I
TELEPHONE ISOI) 3 5 ^ - 4 0 0 0

July 14, '1995

Kent L. Christiansen
Christiansen & Sonntag
420 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Wilderness Building Systems vs. Vance

Dear Kent:
I'm in receipt of your letter of July 13, 1995. The Agreement
between Vance and the Robinsons was an oral agreement entered into
with full knowledge of Scott Mitchell, attorney for the Robinsons.
Pursuant to that Agreemertt Mr. Vance was to'receive 40% of all
amounts recovered by the Robinsons after a judgment was entered
against Hubble and Wilderness Building Systems, subject to an
offset for attorney's fees as set forth in the Response to Claim of
Exemption filed by Scott Mitchell, a copy of which is enclosed
herewith.
Relative to the confidentiality provision of the Settlement
Agreement, I'm asking that you and Mr. Mitchell agree between
yourselves and your clients to share the Settlement Agreement with
me and mine. Judge Wilkinson expects us to work this out among us
however failing that, I will immediately present the matter back to
him for additional enforcement.
Please let me know no later than Wednesday, July 19 if your
clients are willing to cooperate with the Courts' Order which says
that "the parties shall attempt to determine, agree and divide
among themselves the amounts to be paid to or retained by each,
Robinsons, Vance and Hubble." Your cooperation is appreciated.
Sincerely,

JpFREY^CT^WINTON
JCS:js
Enclosure
cc: Dennis Vance
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EXHIBIT "D"

EXHIBIT D

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

DISTRICT

COURT

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

ROBINSON, LEON W
PLAINTIFF

vs
GNEITING, KAY
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

CASE NUMBER 920902754 CV
DATE 10/12/95
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK WTF

IN-COURT CONFERENCE

P. ATTY. MITCHELL, SCOTT B
D. ATTY. CHRISTIANSEN, K & SWINTON, J

THIS CASE COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING (IN
CHAMBERS) , WITH APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES BE DISCLOSED, HOWEVER IT
IS TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AS TO THE ATTORNEY'S FOR ROBINSON,
GNEITING, AND VANCE. THE PARTIES AGREED ON FORMULA, AND
JUDGMENTS WERE DETERMINED. MR. SWINTON TO PREPARE THE JUDGMENT.

0 0 087S

EXHIBIT "E"

EXHIBIT E
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUDGEMENT

Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178
STOKER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant Dennis Vance
311 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-4000

OCT 2.4 1995
LT/GAKE COUNTY-^
By
Deputy ClOfk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LEON W. ROBINSON and
ARLENE ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT ON CLAIM OF
OF DENNIS VANCE

aao3Tu

KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK
HUBBLE; and WILDERNESS
BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 920902754

vs.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

DENNIS VANCE,
Third Party Defendant.
The matter of determining the amount of the exemption to which
Dennis Vance is entitled based upon this Court's Order of July 10,
1995, was presented by Memoranda filed by Jeffrey C. Swinton of the
law firm of Stoker & Swinton, on behalf of the movant, Third Party
Defendant, Dennis Vance ("Vance"), with responsive Memoranda filed
by Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag
on

behalf

of

Third

Party Plaintiffs, Kerry Rick Hubble and

Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. ("Hubble"), and by Scott Mitchell

(K^

on behalf of Plaintiffs, Leon and Arlene Robinson ("Robinsons"), as
well as in oral argument in a Hearing held on October 12, 1995,
with all three counsel in attendance.
Based upon the Memoranda and Arguments, this Court has ordered
the attorneys for Hubble and Robinson to disclose the amount of
consideration set forth in the March 16, 1995, Settlement Agreement
between Hubble and Robinsons to the Court and ordered them and
counsel for Vance to maintain that figure in confidence between
them alone. The Court further denied Vance's claim for recovery of
attorney's fees.

Having therefore read the Memoranda, heard oral

arguments and received information regarding the amount of final
settlement;
THIS COURT HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF THE
EXEMPTION IN FAVOR OF DENNIS VANCE, AND AGAINST KERRY RICK HUBBLE,
AND WILDERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, in the
amount of $12,057.37, plus pre-judgment interest accruing from
March 16, 1995, to October 12, 1995, at the statutory rate of 10%
per annum for an additional amount of $693.71. The TOTAL JUDGMENT
is therefore $12,751.08.
Interest shall continue to accrue on the Total Judgment amount
from October 12, 1995, until paid in full at the post-judgment rate
of 9.22% per annum.
MADE AND ENTERED THIS X

\ DAY OF OCTOBER, 1995.
BY TttE COURT:

/Homer F. Wilkinson
/ D i s t r i c t Court Judge
2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE«
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the

[ 2^

day of

October, 1995, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment
was transmitted via Facsimile to the following:
Kent L. Christiansen
Christiansen & Sonntag
420 E. South Temple, #345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
359-3763
Scott B. Mitchell
175 South Main Street
Suite 1112
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
359-5473
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EXHIBIT "F"

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33

667
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all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the
appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case.
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless otherwise
specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other
order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed
or modified shall be executed.
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; e n t r y of decision.
When a judgment, decree, or order is reversed, modified, or the
reasons shall be stated concisely in writing and filed with the
clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or dissenting may
likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall
constitute the entry of the judgment of the court.
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument,
the /court concludes that a case satisfies the criteria set forth in
Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the case by order without written
opinion. The decision shall have only such effect as precedent
as is provided for by Rule 31(f).
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the
decision, the clerk shall give notice to the respective parties
and make the decision public in accordance with the direction
of the court.
(Amended effective October 1,1992.)
Rule 31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argument without written opinion.
(a) Motion and stipulation for expedited hearing. After the filing of all briefs in an appeal, a party may move for an
expedited decision without a written opinion. The motion shall
be in the form prescribed by Rule 23 and shall describe the
nature of the case, the issues presented and any special
reasons the parties may have for an expedited decision. The
court may dispose of any qualified case under this rule upon
its own motion before or after oral argument.
(b) Cases which qualify for expedited decision. The
following are matters which the court may consider for expedited decision without opinion:
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues
based primarily on documents;
(2) summary judgments;
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim;
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction; and
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated issues
of law.
(c) In all motions brought under this rule, the substantive
rules of law should be deemed settled, although the parties
may differ as to their application.
(d) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision. The
court will not grant a motion for an expedited appeal in cases
raising substantial constitutional issues, issues of significant
public interest, issues of law of first impression, or complicated issues of fact or law.
(e) Procedure if expedited motion is granted. If a
tnotion for expedited decision is granted, the appeal will be
given an expedited setting for oral argument within 45 to 60
days from the date of the order granting the motion. Within
two days after submission of the appeal, the court will conference, decide the case, and issue a written order which need not
be accompanied by an opinion. Entry of the order by the clerk
in the records of the court, shall constitute the entry of the
judgment of the court.
(f) Effect as precedent. Appeals decided under this rule
will not stand as precedent, but, in other respects, will have
the same force and effect as other decisions of the court.
(g) Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to the court
after the case has been submitted for decision that a written
opinion should be issued, the time limitation in paragraph (e)

(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money
in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law
shall be payable from the date the judgment was entered in
the trial court.
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a
first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court
may order that the damages be paid by the pfcrty or by the
party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based
on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose
such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing
the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any
party or upon its own motion. A party may request
damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's
motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a
motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the
court, the court shall issue to the party or the party's
attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall
set forth the allegations which form the basis of the
damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond
unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The order
to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may
be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing.
Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) l b whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by
law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by
the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be
taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is
affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or
taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases
involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an
award of costs for or against the state shall be at the discretion
of the court unless specifically required or prohibited by law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds
and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed
as costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the
actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda
and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual
costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the
record, including costs of the reporter's transcript unless
otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the
fees for filincr and docketing the appeal.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e)

Rule 59
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Role 59. New trials; a m e n d m e n t s of j u d g m e n t
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or action has not been personally served upon the defendant as
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclu- is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospecsions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
tive application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
discretion by which either party was prevented from more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
having a fair trial.
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determina- or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
tion by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence independent action.
could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evimaking the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. dence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties,
have been given under the influence of passion or preju- is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears
dice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
other decision, or that it is against law.
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
(7} Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be rights of the parties.
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) Stay upon e n t r y of judgment. Execution or other
new trial is made under Subdivision (aXD, (2), (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the upon the entry of the judgment, unless the court in its
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service discretion and on such conditions for the security of the
within which to eerve opposing affidavits. The time within adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment In its
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may
be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days discretion and on such conditions for the security of the
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution
of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief
new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed
verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendgrounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter o r amend a j u d g m e n t . A motion to ment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant
alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 to Rule 62(b).
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken
days after entry of the judgment.
from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving,
Rule 60. Relief from j u d g m e n t or order.
or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party.
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken 'the
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay,
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing the
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas
bond is approved by the court.
with leave of the appellate court
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When
discovered evidence; fraud, etc* On motion and upon such an appeal is taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice an officer or agency of either, or by direction of any department
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judg- of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be required
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) from the appellant.
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defennewly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under dant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlaw-x , -,w^v / m / .
j /...v..iU— k A ^ A f n « sUnrunmntorl intrinfully holding public office, civil or military, within this state,
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(i) Examination of defendant or t h i r d party. The defendant may be required to attend before the court or a master
appointed by the court, to be examined on oath respecting his
property. Any person owing debts to the defendant, or having
in his possession or under his control any credits or other
personal property belonging to the defendant, may likewise be
required to appear before the court or a master and be
examined respecting the same. The court or master, after any
examination conducted pursuant to this subdivision, may
order personal property capable of manual delivery to be
delivered to the officer, on such terms as may be just, having
reference to any liens thereon or claims against the same, and
may require a memorandum to be given of all other personal
property, containing the amount and description thereof. The
court may make quch provision for witness fees and mileage as
may be just, provided that if any third party has refused to
give the officer executing the writ a memorandum of any debts
or credits, requested under the provisions of Subdivision (h) of
this rule, such party may be required to pay the costs of any
proceeding taken for the purpose of obtaining such information.
(j) Sale of attached p r o p e r t y before judgment.
(1) Where property is perishable. If any of the
property attached is perishable, the officer must sell the
same in the manner in which such property is sold on
execution. The proceeds and other property attached by
him must be retained by him to answer any judgment
that may be recovered in the action, unless released or
discharged, or subjected to execution upon another judgment recovered previous to issuing the attachment.
(2) Other property. Whenever property has been
taken by an officer under a writ of attachment, and it is
made to appear satisfactorily to the court that the interest
of the parties to the action will be subserved by a sale
thereof, the court may order such property sold in the
same manner as property sold under an execution, and
the proceeds to be deposited in the court to abide the
judgment in the action. Such order can be made only upon
notice to the adverse party, in case such party has been
personally served in the action.
(k) Satisfaction of judgment; deficiency; redelivery of
property. Ifjudgment is recovered by the plaintiff, the officer
must satisfy the same out of the property attached by him
which has not been delivered to the defendant or a claimant as
herein provided, or subjected to a prior lien, if it is sufficient
for that purpose, by paying to the plaintiff the proceeds of all
sales of perishable property sold by him, or of any debts or
credits collected by him or so much as shall be necessary to
satisfy the judgment; and, if any balance remains due and an
execution shall have been issued on the judgment, by selling
under the execution so much of the property, real or personal,
as may be necessary to satisfy the balance, if enough for that
purpose remains in his hands. Notice of the sales must be
given and the sales conducted as in other cases of sales on
execution. If, after selling all the property attached by him
remaining in his hands and after deducting his fees and
applying the proceeds, together with the proceeds of any debts
or credits collected by him, to the payment of the judgment,
any balance shall remain due, the officer must proceed to
collect the same as upon an execution in other cases. Whenever the judgment shall have been paid, the officer, upon
reasonable demand, must deliver to the defendant the attached property remaining in his hands and any proceeds of
the property attached unapplied on the judgment.
(1) Proceedings where defendant prevails. If the defendant recovers judgment against the plaintiff, any undertaking
received in the action, all the proceeds of sales and money
collected by the officer and all the property attached remain-
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attachment shall be discharged and the property released
therefrom.
(m) Liability of t h i r d persons after attachment. All
persons having in their possession or under their control any
credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant,
or owing any debts to the defendant at the time of service upon
them of a copy of the writ of attachment shall be, unless such
property is delivered up or transferred or such debts are paid
to the officer, liable to the plaintiff for the amount of such
credits, property or debts, until the attachment is discharged,
or such debts, credits, or other personal property are released
from the attachment, or until any judgment recovered by the
plaintiff is satisfied. Payment of such debts, or delivery or
transfer of such property or debts, to the officer shall be 6
sufficient discharge for the same as to the defendant.
(n) Release of a t t a c h m e n t u p o n real property. Whenever an order has been made discharging or releasing an
attachment upon real property, a certified copy of such order
must be filed in the office of the county recorder in which the
notice of attachment has been filed, and shall be indexed in
like manner.
(o) Attachment before m a t u r i t y of claim. A party may
commence an action upon an obligation before it is due and
have an attachment against the property of the debtor upon
any one or more of the grounds set forth in Subdivisions (a)(4),
(5), (6) and (7) of this rule. The property attached, or its
proceeds, shall be held subject to the judgment thereafter to be
rendered; but no judgment shall be rendered on such claim
until the obligation shall by its terms become due.
Rule 64D. Garnishment.
(a) Availability of writ of garnishment (Pre-judgment
a n d after judgment). Except as provided in Rule 64A and as
authorized and permitted therein a writ of garnishment is
available as provided for herein.
(i) Before j u d g m e n t . A writ of garnishment is available as a means of attachment before judgment, other
than for defendant's earnings from personal services as
hereinafter defined in Subdivision (dXvii), at any time
after the filing of a complaint in cases in which a writ of
attachment is available under Rule 64C.
(ii) After j u d g m e n t or order. A writ of garnishment
is available in aid of execution to satisfy a money judgment or other order requiring the payment of money. Such
judgments and orders are hereinafter sometimes referred
to collectively as "judgment".
(iii) Property subject to garnishment. The property
subject to garnishment that a writ may be used to levy
upon or affect is all the accrued credits, chattels, goods,
effects, debts, choses in action, money and other personal
property and rights to property of the defendant in the
possession of a third person, or under the control or
constituting a performance obligation to the defendant of
any third person, whether due or yet to become due at the
time of service of the writ of garnishment, which are not
exempt from garnishment or exempt under any applicable
provisions of state or federal law (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "Property Subject to Garnishment").
(iv) As used in this Rule 64D, the term "plaintiff'
means the person or entity seeking by garnishment to
attach or execute upon the property of another subject to
garnishment and the term "defendant" means the person
or entity whose property subject to garnishment is sought
to be attached or executed upon by the plaintiff.
(b) Requirements for issuance of a prejudgment writ
of garnishment. The clerk shall issue a prejudgment writ or
writs of garnishment, with or without notice to the defendant,
directed to the person(s) sought to be charged as garnishee(s)
and so identified in the affidavit required by Subdivision (b)(i)
\- -.i-i
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filed. Several writs may be issued at the same time so long as
there is only one named garnishee in a single writ. No writ
shall issue unless there is attached thereto the fee required by
Subdivision (dXii). Subject to Rule 64A, the court shall issue
its order for the issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment only upon the occurrence of the following:
(i) A finding that the plaintiff has filed with the clerk
an affidavit briefly setting forth: admissible evidence of
facts showing that plaintiff's claim is one for which
attachment is authorized by Rule 64C; the amount due
the plaintiff for which the complaint seeks judgment; that
plaintiff has good reason to believe and does believe that
defendant has Property Subject to Garnishment in the
possession or in the control of or otherwise owing from one
or more specified third persons who plaintiff seeks to
charge as garnishees or that such third persons plaintiff
seeks to charge as garnishees are otherwise indebted to
the defendant; and that such Property Subject to Garnishment is not earnings for the personal services of the
defendant, or otherwise exempt from garnishment.
(ii) A finding that plaintiff has filed with the clerk a
bond or undertaking in the form and amount required for
the issuance of a writ of attachment.
(iii) Exceptions to the sufficiency of the sureties on
plaintiff's prejudgment garnishment bond or undertaking
and the justification of such sureties shall be made within
the times and in the manner and with the effect provided
in Rule 64C(c).
(c) Requirements for issuance of writ of garnishment
after judgment or other order. After the entry of a judgment or other order requiring the payment of money, the clerk
of any court from which execution thereon may be issued shall
issue a writ or writs of garnishment, without the necessity for
an undertaking, upon the filing of an application by the
plaintiff: (i) identifying the person sought to be charged as a
garnishee; (ii) stating whether such property consists in whole
or in part of earnings from personal services as hereinafter
defined in Subdivision (dXvii) of this rule and (iii) stating the
remaining amount due on the judgment. Several writs may be
issued at the same time so long as there is only one named
garnishee in a single writ. No writ shall issue unless there is
attached thereto the fee required by Subdivision (dXii).
(d) Content and effect of writ; to whom directed
(Pre-judgment or after judgment).
(i) The writ of garnishment shall be issued in the name
of the State of Utah and shall be directed to the person or
persons designated in the plaintiff's affidavit or application as garnishee or garnishees, advising each such person that each is attached as garnishee in the action, and
commanding each of them not to pay or deliver any
non-exempt Property Subject to Garnishment as defined
in Subdivision (aXiii) herein in their possession, custody
or control, or part thereof, due or to become due to the
defendant up to the amount remaining due on the judgment (Subdivision (cXiii)) if the writ is issued after
judgment or the amount claimed to be due the plaintiff
(Subdivision (bXi)) if a prejudgment writ is issued, whichever is applicable, and to retain possession and control of
all such property until further order of the court or as
otherwise discharged or released as provided for herein.
In the case of a prejudgment writ, the writ shall contain a
designation that it is a prejudgment writ and further note
the date and time of expiration of the writ. At the time the
writ of garnishment is issued, the clerk shall attach to the
writ a notice of garnishment and exemptions, interrogatories to the garnishee and two copies of an application by
which the defendant may request a hearing.
(ii) The writ shall require the garnishee to give an-
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the date of service of the writ. Service of a copy of the
answers to interrogatories shall be made upon the plaintiff and the original filed with the clerk. The plaintiff shall
provide a $10.00 fee to the garnishee. The interrogatories
may in substance inquire: (1) whether the garnishee is
indebted to the defendant, either in property or in money,
whether the same is now due and, if not, when it is to
become due; (2) whether there is any Property Subject to
Garnishment in the possession, custody or control of the
garnishee and, if so, the value of the same; (3) whether the
garnishee knows of any debts owing to the defendant,
whether due or not, or of any Property Subject to Garnishment belonging to the defendant or in which defendant has an interest, whether in the possession or under
the control of the garnishee or another, and, if so, the
particulars thereof; (4) whether the garnishee is retaining
or deducting any amount in satisfaction of a claim the
garnishee has against the plaintiff or the defendant, a
designation as to whom such claim relates, and the
amount retained or deducted; and (5) as to any other
relevant information plaintiff may desire, including defendant's job, position or occupation, defendant's rate and
method of compensation, defendant's pay period and the
computation of the amount of defendant's accrued disposable earnings attached by the writ.
(iii) If the garnishee has possession, custody or control
of Property Subject to Garnishment, the garnishee shall
serve within five (5) business days of service of the writ of
garnishment upon the garnishee a copy of the writ of
garnishment, answers to interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and two copies of an application by which a hearing may be requested, upon: (1) the
defendant at the last known address of the defendant
shown on the records of the garnishee at the time the writ
of garnishment was served on the garnishee; and (2) upon
any other person shown upon the records of the garnishee
to be a co-owner or having an interest in the property or
money garnisheed at the last known address of the
co-owner or other interested person as shown on the
records of the garnishee at the time the writ of garnishment was served on the garnishee. If that which is
garnisheed is an account, such as a bank account or the
like, the copies of the writ of garnishment, answers to
interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions,
and applications for hearing shall be served at the addresses maintained in the records of the garnishee for
that account. Service shall be by first class mail or by
hand delivery to the defendant and all others. In the
answer to interrogatories, the garnishee shall state that
the garnishee has mailed or hand delivered a copy of the
writ of garnishment, answers to interrogatories, notice of
garnishment and exemptions, and two copies of an application by which a hearing may be requested to the
defendant qnd all other persons entitled thereto and state
the manner and date of compliance therewith.
(iv) The notice of garnishment and exemptions that is
to be served upon the defendant and others entitled to its
receipt shall indicate in substance that certain money is
exempt from garnishment including but not limited to,
Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income
benefits, Veterans' benefits, unemployment benefits,
Workers' Compensation benefits, public assistance (welfare), alimony, child support, certain pensions, and part or
all of wages or other earnings from personal services. The
notice shall also indicate that the defendant or other
person notified must request a hearing within ten days
from the date of service of the notice upon the defendant
or other person, but in no case later than the time at
—L^U *u« *^,vv4 A^flfo tH« Htsnosition of the Prooerty
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Subject to Garnishment provided for herein, which 6hall
not be sooner than ten (10) days from the service of the
notice, if such defendant or other person desires to claim
any exemption that has not already been reflected in the
answers to interrogatories, believes that the writ of garnishment was issued improperly, or that the answers to
interrogatories are inaccurate. For purposes of this provision, the date of service shall be the date of mailing, if
mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and no
period for mailing (Rule 6(e)) shall be used in computing
the time period.
(v) Priority among writs of garnishment served upon a
garnishee shall be in order of their service.
(vi) A writ of garnishment attaching earnings for personal services shall attach only that portion of the defendant's accrued and unpaid disposable earnings hereinafter specified. The writ shall so advise the garnishee and
shall direct the garnishee to withhold from the defendant's accrued disposable earnings only the amount attached pursuant to the writ. Earnings for personal services shall be deemed to accrue on the last day of the
period in which they were earned or to which they relate.
If the writ is served before or on the date the defendant's
earnings accrue and before the same have been paid to the
defendant, the writ shall be deemed to have been served
at the time the periodic earnings accrued;
(vii) "Earnings" or "earnings from personal services'*
means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments
pursuant to a pension or retirement program. "Disposable
earnings" means that part of a defendant's earnings
remaining after the deduction of all amounts required by
law to be withheld. ,For purposes of a garnishment to
enforce payment of a.judgment arising out of a failure to
support dependent children, earnings also include, in
addition to those items listed above, periodic payments
pursuant to insurance policies of any type, including
unemployment compensation, insurance benefit payments, and all gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined, including profit gained through sale
or conversion of capital assets or as otherwise modified or
adopted by law for the support of dependent children.
(viii) The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable earnings of defendant (if an individual) becoming due
the defendant which is subject to garnishment is the
lesser of:
(A) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's disposable earnings (fifty per centum for a garnishment to
enforce payment of a judgment arising out of failure
to support dependent children) computed for the pay
period for which the earnings accrued; or
(B) The amount by which the defendant's aggregate disposable earnings computed for the pay period
for which the earnings accrued exceeds the number of
weeks in the period multiplied by thirty times the
federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair
Labor Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings
are payable.
(ix) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the garnishee shall treat the defendant's earnings becoming due
from the garnishee as the defendant's entire aggregate
earnings for the purpose of computing the sum attached
by the garnishment,
(e) Service of writ; return; general service (Pre-judgment or after judgment). The writ, any order pursuant to
subdivision^) of this rule, and any order pursuant to Rule
£AI/Q\
.Koii K* aprvori unon the garnishee by a sheriff,
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order and return thereof made in the same manner as a return
of service upon a summons. All other service may be by first
class mail or hand delivery.
(f) Release or discharge of garnishment (Pre-judgment or after judgment). At any time either before or after
the service of any writ of garnishment, the defendant may
obtain a release or discharge thereof in the same manner and
under the same conditions as a release or discharge of a writ
of attachment may be obtained under the provisions of Subdivision (f) of Rule 64C. The plaintiff may release a writ of
garnishment by filing with the clerk a release of garnishment
and serving a copy thereof upon the garnishee.
(g) Answer of garnishee; delivery of p r o p e r t y (Prej u d g m e n t or after judgment). The garnishee shall, within
the time required by Subdivision (d)(ii) hereof, serve upon the
court and the plaintiff verified answers to the interrogatories
and provide proofs) of service upon defendant of the copy of
the writ of garnishment, answers to interrogatories, the notice
of garnishment and exemptions, and the applications by
which a hearing may be requested, stating the manner and
date of service. The garnishee may also deliver to the officer
serving the writ the Property Subject to Garnishment as
shown by the answer of the garnishee, and the officer shall
make return of such property and money with the writ to the
court, to be dealt with as thereafter ordered by the court.
Thereupon, the garnishee shall be relieved from further liability in the proceedings, unless the answer shall be successfully controverted as hereinafter provided or the garnishee
has willfully failed to serve copies of the writ of garnishment,
answers to interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and the applications by which a request for a hearing
may be made on the defendant and other persons entitled
thereto.
(h) Procedure (Pre-judgment or after judgment). The
defendant or any other person who owns or claims an interest
in the property subject to garnishment that is garnisheed may
request a hearing to claim any exemption to the garnishment,
or to challenge the issuance of the writ or the accuracy of the
answers to interrogatories. Such request must be filed within
ten days of the service (for purposes of this provision the date
of service shall be the date of mailing if mailed or date of
delivery if hand-delivered and no period for mailing pursuant
to Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the time period) of the
copy of the materials required to be served by Subdivision
(dXiii) upon the defendant and all others entitled to receive
the same. A request for hearing filed prior to any request for
the issuance of an Order to the garnishee to pay Property
Subject to Garnishment shall be deemed as timely filed. The
request for a hearing, which shall be provided by the garnishee to the defendant and other persons shall be in a form to
enable the defendant or other person to specify the grounds
upon which the defendant challenges the issuance of the writ
or the accuracy of the answers to interrogatories, or claims the
amount garnisheed to be exempt, in whole or in part, including, but not limited to exemptions claimed for Social Security
benefits, Supplemental Security Income benefits, Veterans'
benefits, unemployment benefits, Workers' Compensation benefits, public assistance (welfare) benefits, alimony and child
support, pensions, wage or other earnings for personal service,
and non-ownership of the garnisheed property. Where personal services are compensated, but no amounts are required
by law to be withheld, the amounts that would have been
required to be withheld by law had the defendant been an
employee of the garnishee are exempt.
(i) If no request for hearing is filed. If a request for
hearing is not filed as provided for in this Rule and the
time for doing so has expired and the writ of garnishment
was issued in aid of execution of a judgment or order for
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plaintiffs request, shall release the Property Subject to and the other party to the principal action a reply to the whole
Garnishment paid into court to plaintiff or plaintiff's or any part thereof and may also allege any matters which
attorney, or shall issue an order to the garnishee to pay would charge the garnishee with liability except that all
the Property Subject to Garnishment that was withheld claims for exemptions to garnishment or non-ownership of
by the garnishee directly to plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney property garnisheed shall be resolved under the procedures as
or as otherwise ordered by the court. If a request for otherwise provided for in Subdivision (h) herein. Such new
hearing is not filed as provided for in this Rule and the matter in reply shall be taken as denied and the matter thus
time for doing so has expired and the writ issued was a at issue shall be tried in the same manner as other issues of
prejudgment writ of garnishment, then the court or the like nature. Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict or
clerk, upon plaintiffs request, shall issue an order to the finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according
garnishee to pay the Property Subject to Garnishment to such verdict or finding. Costs shall be awarded in accorinto court by delivery of such property to the sheriff or dance with the provisions of Rule 64(d).
constable for that purpose. Property Subject to Garnish(j) Proceedings on failure of garnishee to comply
ment that is paid into court pursuant to a prejudgment with rule (Pre-judgment or after judgment). If a garwrit of garnishment or at any time when a request for nishee fails to answer interrogatories after payment of the
hearing has been filed shall be held by the clerk pending required fee, or if any garnishee shall fail to send to the
order of the court.
defendant the copy of the writ, answers to interrogatories,
(ii) Effect of failure to r e q u e s t hearing. If the notice and applications required by Sections (d)(iii) of this
defendant or any other person to whom the materials Rule, the court may order the garnishee to appear before the
required to be served by Subdivision (d)(iii) fails to re- court and show cause why the garnishee should not be held in
quest a hearing as provided for herein, then defendant contempt therefor and why the court should not order the
and such other persons shall be deemed to have accepted garnishee to pay expenses and costs incurred by other parties
as correct the garnishee's answers to interrogatories and to the proceeding as a result of garnishee's failure. After the
the amounts stated therein to be not exempt from gar- garnishee has been personally served with an order to appear
nishment except as reflected in the answers to interroga- before the court and show cause, the court may make such
orders as are just. Unless the court finds there was substantial
tories.
(iii) If a request for h e a r i n g is filed. If a request for justification for the garnishee's failure or that other circumhearing is filed by or on behalf of the defendant or by any stances make an award of expenses or costs unjust, the court
other person, the court shall set the matter for hearing shall order the garnishee to pay reasonable expenses, includwithin ten (10) days from the filing of the request and ing attorney's fees, incurred as a result of garnishee's failure.
serve notice of that hearing upon all parties and claim(k) Release of garnishee for a m o u n t paid (Pre-judgants by first class mail. If the court determines at the m e n t or after judgment). Except as provided for herein, a
hearing that the writ was issued improperly, that the garnishee who acts in accordance with this Rule shall be
answers to interrogatories are inaccurate, or that any released from all demands by the defendant for all Property
assets garnisheed are exempt from or are not subject to Subject to Garnishment .that is paid, delivered or accounted
garnishment, the court shall immediately issue an order for by the garnishee pursuant to this Rule.
to the garnishee releasing such assets or portion thereof
(1) Interpleader of t h i r d persons (Pre-judgment or
from the writ of garnishment. If the court finds that the after judgment). When any person other than the defendant
assets or a portion thereof are subject to garnishment and claims or may claim that the property held in the possession,
not exempt, it shall issue an order to pay the Property custody, or control of the garnishee pursuant to a Writ is not
Subject to Garnishment directly to plaintiff or plaintiff's subject to garnishment, the court may on motion order that
attorney or as otherwise ordered by the court, except in such claimant be interpleaded as a defendant to the garnishthe case of a prejudgment writ of garnishment where the ment action, and if not already subject to the jurisdiction of
order shall require that such property be paid into court the court, provide for notice thereof, in such form as the court
by delivery of such property to the sheriff or constable for shall direct, together with service of a copy of the order upon
that purpose. Property Subject to Garnishment that is such third-party claimant in the manner required for the
paid into court shall be held by the clerk pending order of service of a summons. Thereupon the garnishee may pay or
the court
deliver to the court such property held pursuant to the Writ,
(iv) If the property is o t h e r t h a n money or its which shall be a complete discharge from all liability to any
equivalent. Where the property is other than money or party for the amount so paid or property so delivered. The
its equivalent, the court shall order that the garnishee third-party claimant shall thereupon be deemed a defendant
deliver such property to the sheriff, constable, deputy, or to the garnishment action and shall answer within 10 days,
such other person designated by court order. In the case of setting forth any claim or defense. In case of default, judgment
a writ issued after judgment, the person to whom the may be rendered as in any other cases of default which shall
property was delivered shall sell as much of such property extinguish any claim of such third-party claimant.
as may be necessary to satisfy the judgment together with
(m) Claims of garnishee against plaintiff or defencosts of the garnishment proceedings and deposit the d a n t (Pre-judgment or after judgment). Every garnishee
proceeds into court to be distributed by order of the court. shall be allowed to retain or deduct out of the Property Subject
Any surplus of such personal property or the proceeds to Garnishment all demands against the plaintiff and against
thereof necessary to satisfy the writ of garnishment shall the defendant of which the garnishee could have availed itself
be returned to the defendant unless otherwise ordered by if the garnishee had not been served as garnishee, whether the
a court of competent jurisdiction. In the case of a prejudg- same are at the time due or not so long as the claims are
ment writ, the person to whom the property is delivered liquidated, but only to the extent that the amounts retained
shall maintain possession of the property until further and deducted are applied to reduce a debt or other obligation
order of the court,
of the plaintiff or defendant, except that should such property,
(i) Reply to answer of garnishee; trial of issues; judg- otherwise subject to garnishment, be held as security for the
m e n t (Pre-judgment o r after Judgment). The plaintiff or payment of a debt or other obligation of the defendant to the
defendant may, within 10 days after the service of any garnishee, then such property need not be applied at that time
— ^ ^ ^ ^ M ^ a a flu unA ««rvft unon the irarnishee but must remain subject to being applied at any time pending
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the payment in full of the debt or other obligation. In answering the interrogatories propounded to the garnishee, the
garnishee shall specify the amount retained or deducted and
the person against whom the claim is made. Amounts retained
and deducted for amounts owed by the plaintiff to the garnishee shall also be applied in reduction of any judgment
amount rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant.
All amounts properly garnisheed in excess of those amounts
retained or deducted pursuant to this subdivision are subject
to payment and distribution in accordance with this Rule.
(n) Liability of garnishee on negotiable instruments
(Pre-judgment or after judgment). No person shall be
liable as garnishee by reason of having drawn, accepted, made
or endorsed any negotiable instrument which is not in the
possession, custody, or control of the garnishee at the time of
service of the writ of garnishmeiit.
(o) When garnishee is mortgagee or pledgee (Prejudgment or after judgment). When any Property Subject
to Garnishment is mortgaged or pledged, or in any way held
for the payment of a debt to the garnishee, the plaintiff may
obtain an order from the court authorizing the plaintiff to pay
the total amount of the obligation to the garnishee in accordance with the terms of the mortgage, pledge or obligation,
and requiring the garnishee to deliver such Property Subject
to Garnishment according to the order of the court upon
payment to such garnishee of the total obligation.
(p) Where property is held to s e c u r e performance of
other obligation (Pre-judgment or after judgment). If
the Property Subject to Garnishment secures any obligation
other than the payment of money and if the obligation secured
does not require the personal performance of the defendant
and can be performed by the plaintiff or its designee, the court
may, upon plaintiffs motion, authorize the plaintiff or its
designee to perform the obligation or tender performance and
that upon such performance, or any tender thereof which is
refused, the garnishee shall deliver the Property Subject to
Garnishment in accordance with the order of the Court.
(q) Disposition of property (Pre-judgment or after
judgment). The Property Subject to Garnishment under
either Subdivision (o) or (p) of this Rule or the proceeds from
the sale thereof shall be applied to the extent available, first to
satisfy any costs of sale, then to repay any amount paid by the
plaintiff to the garnishee to satisfy the obligation of the
defendant to the garnishee, then to pay the costs to perform
the obligation of the defendant to the garnishee for an obligation other than the payment of money, and then to satisfy the
writ of garnishment.
(r) Order against garnishee for debt not due (Prejudgment or after judgment). When an order is made
requiring a garnishee to pay an amount to the plaintiff or
plaintiff's attorney or into court or otherwise provide property
for disposition by the court and the same is not yet due to the
defendant, payment or providing of property shall not be
required until such payment or property is otherwise due the
defendant from the garnishee.
(s) Failure to proceed against garnisheed property
(Pre-judgment or after judgment). Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Rule, if a plaintiff fails, within sixty
days from the filing of the garnishee's answers to interrogatories, to secure and personally serve on the garnishee an
order requiring the garnishee to pay the property garnisheed
into court or as otherwise provided herein, then the writ,
which commanded the garnishee to hold the amount or
property, shall be released and the garnishee discharged
without further order of the court. If the Property Subject to
Garnishment or any part thereof has been deposited with the
court and the writ of garnishment was issued in aid of the
AYoriitinn of a iudcrment or order for the payment of money,
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garnishee's answers to interrogatories, to request a release of
the property garnisheed from the court in accordance with
Subdivision (h)(i), then the writ shall be released; the garnisheed property shall be returned to the garnishee; and the
garnishee discharged without further order of the court.
Property Subject to Garnishment deposited with the court
pursuant to a prejudgment writ of garnishment shall be
released only upon order of the court. A release under this
subdivision may be stayed upon order of the court for good
cause shown. Such order shall not be binding upon the
garnishee until served upon it.
(t) Costs (Pre-judgment or after judgment).
(i) Costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the
plaintiff and against the defendant in the pursuit of any
garnishee action instituted after judgment unless the
court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the
garnishee action shall abide the final determination of the
cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its officers and
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by
law.
(ii) The plaintiff must serve upon the defendant a copy
of a memorandum of the items of necessary costs and
disbursements in the garnishee action or actions, and file
with the court a like memorandum duly verified stating
that the items are correct, the disbursements have been
necessarily incurred in the garnishee action, and the
items of costs have not been claimed in any previous
memorandum. The memorandum or memoranda may be
filed at any time after judgment is rendered but in no
event later than five days after the receipt of funds that
would pay the judgment in full but for the payment of any
costs associated with a garnishee action for which a
memorandum or memoranda have not been filed with the
court. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed, may,
within seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs of the garnishee action, file a motion to have the
costs taxed by the court.
(iii) All costs incurred in garnishee actions prior to the
rendering of a judgment shall be taxed according to Rule
54(d) of these rules,
(u) (i) A garnishment issued to enforce a judgment obtained by the Office of Recovery Services, within the
Department of Social Services, for repayment of overpayments, as defined in Section 62A-11-202, shall continue to
operate and require the garnishee to withhold the nonexempt portion of disposable earnings, as defined in Subsection 62A-11-103(2), at each succeeding earnings disbursement interval until the garnishment is released in writing
by the court or the Office of Recovery Services.
(ii) The garnishment described in Subdivision (uXi)
may not exceed 25% of earnings, as defined in Subsection
62A-11-103(3), or the amount permitted under Section
303(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 1673(a), whichever is less.
(Amended effective April 24,1989; April 1,1990.)
Rule 64E. Application of rule to other parties.
The foregoing provisions of Rules 64A, 64B, 64C, and 64D
authorizing provisional remedies to the plaintiff in an action
shall likewise be available to a defendant or other party who
has filed a counterclaim, cross-complaint, or other claim
seeking an affirmative judgment, the party seeking such
affirmative judgment being deemed the plaintiff, the party
against whom the judgment is sought being deemed the
defendant, and the counterclaim, cross-complaint or other
claim being deemed the complaint.
Rule 64F. Waiver of bond or undertaking.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 64B, 64C and 64D
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be just, subject to the further direction of the court; provided
that if money is paid into court under this rule it shall be
deposited and withdrawn in accordance with Section 78-27-4,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, or any like statute.
Rule 68. Offer of judgment
(a) Tender of money before suit. When in an action for
the recovery of money only, the defendant alleges in his
answer that before the commencement of the action he tendered to the plaintiff the full amount to which the plaintiff was
entitled, and thereupon deposits in court for the plaintiff the
amount so tendered, and the allegation is found to be true, the
plaintiff cannot recover costs, but must pay costs to the
defendant.
(b) Offer before trial. At any time more than 10 days
before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may
serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be
taken against him for the money or property or to the effect
specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written
notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the
offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service
thereof and thereupon judgment shall be entered. An offer not
accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is
not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable
than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the
making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental
thereto.
(a) Availability of writ of execution. A writ of execution
is available to a judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment or
other order requiring the delivery of property or the payment
of money by a judgment debtor.
(b) Property subject to execution. A writ of execution
may be used to levy upon all of the judgment debtor's personal
property and real property which is not exempt from execution
under state or federal law.
(c) Issuance of writ of execution. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a writ of execution may be issued at any
time within eight years following the entry of a judgment or
order (except an execution may be stayed pursuant to Rule
62), either in the county in which such judgment was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been
filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court.
Notwithstanding the death of a party after judgment, execution thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be enforced, as follows:
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon
the application of an authorized executor or administrator, or successor in interest.
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the
judgment is for the recovery of real or personal property
or the enforcement of a lien thereon.
(d) Contents of writ and to whom it may be
directed. The writ of execution shall be issued in the name of
the State of Utah, and subscribed by the clerk of the court. It
shall be issued to the sheriff or constable of any county in the
state (and may be issued at the same time to different
counties) but where it requires the delivery of possession or
sale of real property, it shall be issued to the sheriff of the
county where the real property or some part thereof is
situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal property, it may be issued to a constable. It must
intelligibly refer to the judgment, stating the court, the docket
number, the county where the same is entered or docketed, the
names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for the

V/ JLAJ

actually due thereon. The writ may be accompanied by a
praecipe executed by the judgment creditor or the judgment
creditor's counsel generally or specifically describing the real
or personal property to be levied upon. It shall be directed to
the sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases
involving real property, and shall require the officer to proceed
in accordance with the terms of the writ; provided that if such
writ is against the property of the judgment debtor generally
it may direct the sheriff or constable to satisfy the judgment,
with interest, out of the non-exempt personal property of the
debtor, and if sufficient non-exempt personal property cannot
be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with
interest, out of the judgment debtor's non-exempt real property.
(e) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution
shall be served at any time within sixty days after its receipt
by the officer. It shall then be returned to the court from which
it issued, and when it is returned the clerk must attach it to
the record.
(f) Service of the writ. Unless the execution otherwise
directs, the officer must execute the writ against the nonexempt property of the judgment debtor by levying on a
sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient property;
collecting or selling the choses in action and selling the other
property in the manner set forth herein. Levy includes the
seizure of the property and holding the property in person or
through one or more agents, including the judgment debtor,
appointed by the officer. When there is more property of the
judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and
accruing costs within view of the officer, the officer must levy
only on such part of the property as the judgment debtor may
indicate, if the property indicated is amply sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and costs.
When an officer has served an execution issued out of any
court the officer may complete the return thereof after such
date of service.
(g) Notice to judgment debtor of sale and of exempt
property and right to a hearing. At the time the writ of
execution is issued, the clerk shall attach to the writ a notice
of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing and two
copies of an application by which the judgment debtor may
request a hearing.
Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable shall serve
upon the judgment debtor, in the same manner as service of a
summons in a civil action, or cause to be transmitted by both
regular and certified mail, returned receipt requested, to the
judgment debtor's last known address as provided by the
judgment creditor, (i) the notice of execution and exemptions
and right to a hearing, and (ii) the application by which the
judgment debtor may request a hearing. Upon service of the
writ, the sheriff or constable may also set the date of sale or
delivery and serve upon the judgment debtor notice of the date
and time of sale or delivery in the same manner as service of
the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing.
The notice of execution and exemptions that is to be served
upon the judgment debtor shall indicate in substance that
certain property is or may be exempt from execution including
but not limited to a homestead; tools of the trade; a motor
vehicle used for the judgment debtor's business or profession;
social security benefits; supplemental security income benefits; veterans'benefits; unemployment benefits; workers'compensation benefits; public assistance (welfare); alimony; child
support; certain pensions; part or all of wages or other
earnings from personal services; certain furnishings and appliances; musical instruments; and heirlooms (each not to
exceed the amount allowed by law). The notice shall also
indicate that the list is a partial list and other various
property exemptions may be available under federal law or
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must request a hearing within ten (10) days from the date of
service of the notice upon the judgment debtor. For purposes of
this provision, the date of service shall be the date of mailing,
if mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and no period
for mailing under Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the
time period.
If the writ, the notice of execution and exemptions and right
to a hearing cannot be served upon the judgment debtor in the
same manner as service of a summons in a civil action, and the
judgment creditor does not have available the judgment
debtor's last known address, only the following notice need be
published under the caption of the case in a newspaper of
general circulation in each county in which the property levied
upon, or some part thereof, is situated:
TO
, Judgment Debtor:
A writ of execution has been issued in the abovecaptioned case, directed to the sheriff or constable of
County, commanding the sheriff or constable as follows:
'WHEREAS,
[Quoting body of writ of
execution]."
YOU MAY HAVE A RIGHT TO EXEMPT PROPERTY
from the sale under statutes of the United States or this
state, including Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter
23, in the manner described in those statutes.
The date of publication shall be deemed the date of service and
the date of publication shall be not less than ten (10) days
prior to the date of sale or delivery.
This paragraph (g) shall not be applicable to judicial mortgage foreclosure proceedings commenced under Utah Code
Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 37.
(h) Request for hearing.
(1) Time for request. The judgment debtor or any
other person who owns or claims an interest in the
property subject to execution may request a hearing to
claim any exemption to the execution, or to challenge the
issuance of the writ. Such request must be filed or served
upon the judgment creditor or the attorney for the judgment creditor within ten (10) days of the service upon the
judgment debtor of the materials required to be served by
paragraph (g) upon the judgment debtor. The request for
a hearing, which shall be provided to the judgment debtor
shall be in a form to enable the judgment debtor to specify
the grounds upon which the judgment debtor challenges
the issuance of the writ or claims the property executed
upon to be exempt, in whole or in part.
(2) If a request for hearing is filed. If a request for
hearing is filed by or on behalf of the judgment debtor, the
court shall set the matter for hearing within ten (10) days
from the filing of the request and serve notice of that
hearing upon all parties by first class mail. If the court
determines at the hearing that the writ was issued
improperly, or that any property seized is exempt from or
is not subject to execution, the court shall ifnmediately
issue an order to the officer releasing such property or
portion thereof from the writ of execution. If the court
finds that the property or a portion thereof is subject to
execution and not exempt, it shall issue an order directing
the officer to proceed with the sale of the non-exempt
property subject to execution. If the originally scheduled
date of sale for which notice has been given has passed,
notice of the new date and time of sale shall be provided as
required herein. No sale may be held until the Court has
decided upon the issues presented at the hearing. At the
hearing, the court may award costs as it deems appropriate.
(3) If no request for hearing is filed. If a request for
"• •
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time for doing so has expired, then the officer shall
proceed to sell or deliver the property subject to execution
in accordance with the writ and this Rule 69.
(4) This paragraph (h) shall not be applicable to judicial mortgage foreclosure proceedings commenced under
Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 37.
(i) Proceedings on sale of property.
(1) Notice of sale. Before the sale of the property on
execution notice thereof must be given as follows: (A) in
case of perishable property or animals, by posting written
notice of the time and place of sale, and generally describing the property to be sold, in the district courthouse and
in at least three other public places of the county or city
where the sale is to take place, for such a time as may be
reasonable, considering the character and condition of the
property; (B) in case of other personal property, by posting
written notice of the time and place of sale, and generally
describing the property to be sold, in the district courthouse and in at least three public places of the county or
city where the sale is to take place, for not less than seven
nor more than 14 days, and by publishing a copy thereof
at least one time not less than one day preceding the sale
in some newspaper of general circulation published or
circulated in the county where the sale is to take place, if
there is one; (C) in case of real property, by posting written
notice of the time and place of sale, and particularly
describing the property, for 21 days, on the property to be
sold, at the place of sale, at the district courthouse of the
county where the real property to be sold is situated, and
in at least three public places of th6 county or city where
the sale is to take place, and by publishing a copy thereof
at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive weeks
immediately preceding the sale, in some newspaper of
general circulation published or circulated in the county,
if there is one. In addition, except for the sale of perishable property or animals, if notice of the date and time of
sale has not been served upon the judgment debtor
previously, notice of the date and time of sale shall be
served upon the judgment debtor personally or by causing
the same to be transmitted by regular or certified mail to
the judgment debtor's last known address.
(2) Postponement. If at the time and place appointed
for the sale of any real or personal property on execution
the officer shall deem it expedient and for the interest of
all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of
purchasers, or other sufficient cause, the officer may
postpone the same from time to time, until the same shall
be completed; and in every such case the officer shall
make public declaration thereof at the time and place
previously appointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a longer time than 72 hours, notice thereof
shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of
such sale is required to be given.
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be made at auction to the highest bidder,
Monday through Saturday, legal holidays excluded, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 8 o'clock p.m. After
sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution
no more shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the
execution nor such officer's deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase at such sale.
When the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the
sale. The sale must be held in a place reasonably accessible to the general public. The property must be sold in
such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and
when the sale is of real property, consisting of several
known lots or parcels, they must be sold separately; or
when a portion of such real property is claimed by a third

person, and the third person requires it to be sold separately, such portion must be thus sold. All sales of real
property must be made at the courthouse of the county in
which the property, or some part thereof, is situated. The
judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the
order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold,
when such property consists of several known lots or
parcels, or of articles which can be sold to advantage
separately, and the officer must follow such directions.
The officer shall pay to the judgment creditor or the
attorney for the judgment creditor so much of the sales
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the
proceeds over the judgment and reasonable accrued costs
must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or the court.
(4) Accounting of sale. Upon request of the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor's attorney, the-plaintiff shall deliver an accounting of any execution sale,
including the amount due on the judgment, accrued costs,
and the amount realized at the sale.
(5) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be
deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the purchaser refuses
to pay the amount bid for the property struck off to such
purchaser at a sale under execution, the officer may again
sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if
any loss is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in
addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of a contempt
of court and may be punished accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in such officer's
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person.
(6) Personal property. When the purchaser of any
personal property pays the purchase money, the officer
making the sale shall deliver the property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery)
and shall execute and deliver to the purchaser a certificate of sale and payment. Such certificate shall state that
all right, title and interest which the debtor had in and to
such property on the day the execution or attachment was
levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is
transferred to the purchaser.
(7) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the
officer shall give to /the purchaser a certificate of sale,
containing: (A) a particular description of the real property sold; (B) the price paid by the purchaser for each lot
or parcel if sold separately; (C) the whole price paid; (D) a
statement to the effect that all right, title, interest and
claim of the judgment debtor in and to the property is
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where such sale
is subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also. A
duplicate of such certificate shall be filed for record by the
officer in the office of the recorder of the county. The real
property sold shall be subject to redemption, except where
the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years'
unexpired term, in which event said sale is absolute.
(j) Redemption of real property from sale.
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be redeemed
by the following persons or their successors in interest:
(A) the judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having a lien by
judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or
on some share or part thereof, subsequent to that on
which the property was sold.
(2) Redemption; how made. The person seeking redemption may make payment of the amount required to
the person from whom the property is being redeemed, or
for such person to the officer who made the sale, or such
officer's successor in office. At the same time the redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom
the redemptioner seeks to redeem, and serve with the

notice to the officer; (A) a certified copy of the judgment
under which the redemptioner claims the right to redeem,
or, if the redemptioner redeems upon a mortgage or other
lien, a copy certified by the recorder; (B) an assignment,
properly acknowledged or proved where the same is
necessary to establish the claim; (C) an affidavit by the
redemptioner or an authorized agent showing the amount
then actually due on the judgment, mortgage or other
lien.
(3) Time for redemption; a m o u n t to be paid. The
property may be redeemed within six months after the
sale by paying the amount of the purchase with a surcharge of 6 percent thereon in addition, together with the
amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable
sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the
property,which the purchaser may have paid thereon
after the purchase, with interest at the lawful rate on
such other amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a
creditor having a lien prior to that of the person seeking
redemption, other than the judgment under which said
purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with
interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any
sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper,
the person seeking redemption may pay the amount
necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to
the court out of which execution or order authorizing the
sale was issued, and at the same time file with the court
and serve upon the purchaser a petition setting forth the
item or items demanded to which the redemptioner objects, together with the grounds of objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for
hearing of such objections. A copy of the order fixing time
for hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than
five days before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing of
the petition the court shall enter an order determining the
amount required for redemption. In the event an additional amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is
required, the person seeking redemption shall pay to the
clerk such additional amount within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the court for redemption.
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of
redemption may, within 60 days after the last redemption
and within six months after the sale, redeem the property
from such last redemptioner in the same manner as
provided in the preceding paragraph, upon paying the
sum of such last redemption, with a surcharge of three
percent thereon in addition, and the amount of any
assessment or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire
insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair
of any improvements upon the property which the last
redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on
such amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien
held by such last redemptioner prior to the redemptioner's own, with interest.
(5) Notice of redemption. Written notice of any redemption shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed
with the recorder of the county. Similar notice shall be
given of any taxes or assessments or any sums for fire
insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair
of any improvements upon the property, paid by the
person redeeming, or the amount of any lien acquired,
other than upon which the redemption was made. Failure
to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemp-

tioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or
other liens.
(6) Certificate of redemption or conveyance. If no
redemption is made within six months after the sale, the
purchaser or the purchaser's assignee is entitled to a
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever 60 days have
elapsed and no other redemption by a creditor has been
made and notice thereof has been given, the last redemptioner, or assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the
expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment
debtor redeems, the judgment debtor must make the
same payments as are required to effect a redemption by
a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is
terminated and the debtor is restored to the debtor's
estate. Upon a redemption by the debtor, the person to
whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to
the debtor a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged.
Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the office of
the county recorder where the property is situated.
(7) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the time of sale until a redemption, and a
redemptioner from the time of redemption until another
redemption, is entitled to receive from any tenant in
possession the rents of the property sold or the value of
the use and occupation thereof. But when any rents or
profits have been received by the judgment creditor or
purchaser, or their assigns, from the property thus sold
preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents
and profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to
be paid; and if the redemptioner or judgment debtor,
before the expiration of the time allowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or creditor, or
their assigns, a written and verified statement of the
amounts of such rents and profits thus received, the
period for redemption is extended five days after such
sworn statement is given by such purchaser or such
purchaser's assigns to such redemptioner or debtor.; If
such purchaser or such purchaser's assigns shall for a
period of one month from and after such demand, fail or
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or
debtor may, within 60 days after such demand, bring an
action to compel' an accounting and disclosure of such
rent$ and profits, and until 15 days from and after the
final determination of such action the right of redemption
is extended to such redemptioner or debtor,
(k) Remedies of purchaser.
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, upon motion, with or
without notice, of the purchaser, or such purchaser's
successor in interest. But it is not waste for the person in
possession of the property at the time ofsah, or entitled to
possession afterwards, during the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same manner in
which it was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary
course of husbandry, or to make the necessary repairs or
buildings thereon or to use wood or timber on the property
therefor, or for the repair offences, or for fuel for a family
while such person occupies the property. After the estate
has become absolute, the purchaser or a successor in
interest may maintain an action to recover damages for
ir\jury to the property by the tenant or other person in
possession after sale and before possession is delivered
under the conveyance.
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of
property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted
therefrom. Where, because of irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property sold
was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the

reversal or discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of
property sold on execution, or a successor in interest, fails
to obtain the property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted
therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, on
motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as the court may prescribe, enter judgment
against such judgment creditor for the price paid by the
purchaser, together with interest. In the alternative, if
such purchaser or a successor in interest, fails to recover
possession of any property or is dispossessed thereof or
evicted therefrom in consequence of irregularity in the
proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property
sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party
and after such notice to the judgment debtor as'the court
may prescribe, revive the original judgment in the name
of the petitioner for the amount paid by sucb purchaser at
the sale, with interest thereon from the time of payment
at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the
judgment so revived shall have the same force and effect
as would an original judgment of the date of the revival.
(1) Contribution a n d reimbursement; how enforced.
When upon an execution against several persons more than
a pro rata part of the judgment is satisfied out of the proceeds
of the sale of the property of one, or one of them pays, without
a sale, more than such person's proportion, and the right of
contribution exists, such person may compel such contribution
from the others; and where a judgment against several is upon
an obligation of one or more as security for the others, and the
surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of
property or otherwise, the surety may require reimbursement
from the principal. The person entitled to contribution or
reimbursement shall, within one month after payment, or sale
of the property in the event there is a sale, file in the court
where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment
and the claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the
filing of such notice the clerk must make an entry thereof in
the margin of the docket which shall have the effect of a
judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent of
their liability for contribution or reimbursement.
(m) Payment of j u d g m e n t by person indebted to judgment debtor. After the issuance of an execution and before
its return, any person indebted to the judgment debtor may
pay to the officer the amount of the debt, or so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's
receipt is a sufficient discharge for the amount paid.
(n) Where property is claimed by t h i r d person. If an
officer shall proceed to levy any execution on any goods or
chattels claimed by any person other than the defendant, or
should the officer be requested by the judgment creditor so to
do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an
undertaking, with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs
and damages that the officer may sustain by reason of the
detention or sale of such property; and until such undertaking
is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such
property.
(o) Order for a p p e a r a n c e of j u d g m e n t debtor;
arrest. At any time when execution may issue on a judgment,
the court from which an execution might issue shall, upon
written motion of the judgment creditor, with or without
notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring
the judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to
appear before the court, a master, or other person appointed
by the court, at a specified time and place to answer concerning the judgment debtor's property. A judgment debtor, or if a
corporation, any officer thereof, may be required to attend
outside the county in which such person resides, but the court
may make such order as to mileage and expenses as is just.
The order may also restrain the judgment debtor from dispos-

ing of any nonexempt property pending the hearing. Upon the an order may be lawfully enforced against a person who is not
hearing such proceedings may be had for the application of the a party, he is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience
property of the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the to the order as if he were a party.
judgment as on execution against such property.
(p) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any Rule 71B. Proceedings where parties not summoned.
(a) Effect of failure to serve all defendants. Where the
time when execution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by
affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the court that any action is against two or more defendants and the summons is
person or corporation has property of such judgment debtor or served on one or more, but not all of them, the plaintiff may
is indebted to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding proceed against the defendants served in the same manner as
two hundred fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, the if they were the only defendants.
(b) Proceedings after judgment against parties not
court may order such person or corporation or any officer or
agent thereof, to appear before the court or a master at a originally served. When a judgment has been recovered
specified time and place to answer concerning the same. against one or more, but not all, of several persons jointly
Witness fees and mileage, if any, may be awarded by the court. indebted upon an obligation, the plaintiff may require any
(q) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it ap- person not originally served with the summons to appear and
show cause why he should not be bound by the judgment in the
pears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of
same manner as though he had been originally served with
the judgment debtor or to be indebted to the judgment debtor
process.
in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execu(c) Summons and affidavit; contents and service. The
tion, claims an interest in the property adverse to such
plaintiff
shall issue a summons, describing the judgment, and
judgment debtor or denies such indebtedness, the court may
requiring
the defendant to appear within the time required for
order such person or corporation to refrain from transferring
appearance in response to an original summons, and show
or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until such time
cause why he should not be bound by such judgment. The
as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to
summons, together with a copy of an affidavit on behalf of the
bring an action to determine such interest or claim and
plaintiff to the effect that the judgment, or some part thereof
prosecute the same to judgment. Such order may be modified
remains unsatisfied, and specifying the amount actually due
or vacated by the court at any time upon such terms as may be thereon, shall be served upon the defendant and returned in
just.
the same manner as the original summons.
(r) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and
(d) What constitutes the pleadings. The pleadings shall
testify in any proceedings brought under this rule in the same
consist
of plaintiffs affidavit, the summons, and the answer of
manner as upon the trial of an issue.
the defendant, if any; provided that if defendant denies his
(s) Order for property to be applied on judgment. The
liability on the obligation upon which the judgment was
court or master may order any property of the judgment
originally recovered, a copy of the original complaint and
debtor, not exempt from execution, in the possession of the
judgment shall be included.
judgment debtor or any other person, or due to the judgment
(e) Hearing; judgment. The matter may be tried as other
debtor, to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment.
cases;
but if the issues are found against the defendant, the
(t) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a
judgment
shall not exceed the amount of the original judgreceiver of the property of the judgment debtor, not exempt
ment
remaining
unsatisfied, with interest and costs.
from execution, and may forbid any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its further order
therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with
PART IX.
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of the
APPEALS.
appointment shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county in which any real estate sought to be affected
Rules 72 to 76. Repealed.
thereby is situated.
Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land
or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any other
specific act and the party fails to comply within the time
specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of
the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the
court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the
party. On application of the party entitled to performance and
upon order of the court, the clerk shall issue a writ of
attachment or sequestration against the property of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court
may also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real
or personal property is within the state, the court in lieu of
directing a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others and such
judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form
of law. When any order or judgment is for the delivery of
possession, the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to
a writ of execution or assistance upon application to the clerk.
Rule 71 A. Process in behalf of and against persons not
parties.
When an order is made in favor of a person who is not a
party to the action, he may enforce obedience to the order by
ih* Bom* mwflUR An if he were a Dartv: and, when obedience to

PARTX.
DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS.
Rule 77. District courts and clerks.
(a) District courts always open. The district courts shall
be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading
or other proper paper, of issuing and returning mesne and
final process, and of making and directing all interlocutory
motions, orders, and rules.
(b) Trials and hearings; orders in chambers. All trials
upon the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as
convenient in a regular courtroom. All other acts or proceedings may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers without
the attendance of the clerk or other court officials and at any
place within the state, either within or without the district;
but no hearing, other than one ex parte, shall be conducted
outside the county wherein the matter is pending without the
consent of all the parties to the action affected thereby.
(c) Clerk's office and orders by clerk. The clerk's office
with the clerk or a deputy in attendance shall be open during
business hours on all days except Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. All motions and applications in the clerk's office
for issuing mesne process, for issuing final process to enforce
and execute judgments, for entering defaults or judgments by

